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Civil No. 7723

In the Supreme Court
OF THE

State of Utah

N. J.

MEAGHER,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

JoE T. JuHAN, PAUL STocK, RAY PHEBus,
and AsHLEY VALLEY OIL CoMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT N. J. MEAGHER.
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT.

For the convenience of the court we
at the end of this brief a title chart. It
tion of the illustrative chart submitted
Meagher in the proceedings below and
as Exhibit A 57.

have attached
is a reproducby respondent
was identified

This action requires determination of the ownership
of the lessees' rights under an oil and. gas lease coverSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing 480 acres of land. Respondent Meagher claims
ownership of an undivided ·y2 interest as to oil only
in the lessees' rights in a 440-acre parcel of the above
tract. In this phase of the controversy, appellants
,Juhan, Stock and Phebus are his adversaries. This
brief is in answer to the brief filed by those appellants.
Respondent Meagher also claims ownership of all of
the lessees' rights in the remaining 40 acres of the
tract (known as the North Forty), and in that controversy only appellant Ashley ·valley Oil Company has
appealed. Appellant Ashley Valley Oil Company has
filed a brief and respondent Meagher will file herewith
a separate brief in answer thereto.
In view of the foregoing, unless otherwise specified,
reference in this brief to the lands in litigation will
refer to the 440-acre tract.
The basic theory of Meagher's case may be summarized thus : Meagher is the owner of the lands involved
subject to a valid oil and gas lease 1 and subject to certain royalties. In Octo her 1944 the lessees' rights to
explore for and produce oil were owned by Stock and
Phebus (an undivided ·lh each). At that time Meagher
believed the lease to be forfeit and knew that no deMeagher, of course, recognizes and does not seek to circumvent in any way the previous ruling of this court on the first
appeal which determined that the lease was not forfeit and had
not been abandoned. I-Iowever, the decision upon appeal did not
purport to determine_ the ownership or quantum of the various
outstanding interests in the property.
1
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veloptnent for oil had been conducted during the preceding 15 years. He requested releases from the lessees.
Stock did release. Phebus did not. Meagher thereby
becan1e entitled to an undivided 1f2 of the lessees' rights,
i.e., the interest 'vhich Stock released to Meagher.
At page ·1 of appellants' brief the action is correctly
described as involving ''the legal effect of a document
designated ~release', Exhibit ~ A'-30, executed by appellant Stock in favor of respondent Meagher under date
of October 21. 1944.''

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Respondent reluctantly criticizes appellants' statenlent of facts. Except for a few conclusions motivated
by the enthusiasm of advocacy, it is correct as far as
it goes. But it definitely fails to state the whole truth
and therefore casts the case in an inaccurate factual
atmosphere.
This phase of the action is concerned with the right to
explore for and produce oil only on a 440-acre parcel of
land. That right is derivative from an oil and gas lease
(A-1), executed in 1924.

By 1929 the lessee's right to explore for and produce
oil had descended by mesne transfers to Stock and
Phebus, each having acquired an undivided ~ interest
in the lessee'~ right~ under the leasehold. We thu~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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have two lines of title to the lessee's right in oil; one
is traceable to Stock, the other to Phebus.
The original lease, known as the Sheridan lease, was
executed in June 1924 (A-1). The lessee's rights to
explore for and produce oil and gas thereunder passed
to Utah Oil Refining Company in 1924 (A-2). Exploration was conducted. Oil was not discovered in paying
quantities but gas was produced. Utah Oil Refining
Company operated the property until· 1929, when that
Company transferred its rights to Stock and Phebus
(A-11). These men, through the Valley Fuel Supply
Company (which they owned), operated the gas property until 1941. Then the equipment was sold to Juhan,
the wells were dismembered and the gas operations
ceased. In the sale of the equipment to Juhan the lessees' rights to explore for and produce gas were also
transferred to him (A-17).
By 1927 respondent Meagher through several conveyances had acquired the fee to the lands in question
subject to outstanding royalty interests and subject to
the oil and gas lease (A-7-8-9-10).
In 1931, Stock and Phebus tried to get the Standard
Oil Con1pany of California to make further explorations. The leasehold .was assigned to Standard for this
purpose (A-12), which in turn assigned it to its operating subsidiary, The California Company (A-13). It remained in this status for three years and then Standard

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and its

snb~idiary

decided not to go forward and the
lessee·~ rights \vere transferred back to Stock and
Phebus in .Jiarch of 1934 (A-14). Ten nrore years
elapsed. By 1944 it \Vas obvious that the property was
not con1n1ercially attractive for gas production. Standard had declined developtnent for oil and, except for
the fortner gas operations, Stock and Phebus, who had
held the lessee'~ rights, had not been able to do anything with the property over a period of 15 years.
Under these circumstances, the usual practice among
reliable oil operators is to quitclaim the leasehold back
to the landowner to clear his title. Note that this is
what Standard and its subsidiary did when they decided
not to carry on. Since these releases were not forthcoming, Meagher did what any landowner would do
under the circumstances. He asked Stock and Phebus
for releases.
Nearly a year went by from the time Meagher began
to clear up his title, and finally, to bring the matter to
a head, Meagher commenced this quiet title action in
October of 1944. Four days after the action was commenced the release which Meagher had requested from ·
Stock was executed and delivered. Meagher thereby acquired the undivided 1j2 interest in the lessee's rights
to oil which is the ~ubject of this action. However,
Phebus did not comply with Meagher's request and
retained his 1;2 interest. The release \vhich Stock gave
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Meagher at that time (A-30) Is the document upon
which this litigation hinges.
Meanwhile, Juhan, who had acquired the lessee's
rights to gas at the time the gas equipment was junked,
proceeded to interest himself in the property for further exploration. He apparently thought that the
proper way to acquire the right to explore for oil would
be to obtain a lease from Meagher. He asked Meagher
for such a lease and was turned down. Then he decided
that perhaps there was vitality in the old lease held
by Stock and Phebus. He made a deal with Phebus by
which he acquired the ·% interest Phebus had. Then he
sent his man around to Stock for the same purpose,
but Stock told Juhan's representative that he had already released back to Meagher.
N 0"\\ we come to the key to the ''equities'' in this
case. Did Stock at this time ask Meagher for a rescission of the release he had given~ No. Did Stock request an opportunity to reinstate his position as a
former lessee~ . No. Did Stock claim any n1istake of
fact or of law~ Not at all. He merely gave Juhan's
n1an, one Charles .s. Hill, a quitclaim of his (Stock's)
interest (A-19). The entire transaction was made expressly subject to two unrecorded written understandings designated "declaration of trust" (A-48), (A-49)
(Appendix A infra), which recognized that Meagher
claimed an adverse interest and provided that if Juhan
could overcome Meagher's claims Stock would partici7
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pate in the victory to the extent of one-eighth, but if
Meagher should prevail Stock would get nothing.
The above is not a recital of fact based on surmise
or circun1stantial evidence. It is ad1nitted in the testimony of Stoek and. is established by \Vritten documents
whieh 'vere produced only after contested discovery
proceedings during· the pretrial hearings.
In other 'vords, less than six n1onths after Stock had
released to ~Ieagher, he tried to transfer the same
interest to Juhan through Charles S. Hill under a
deal by which he could benefit only if the release he
had given to ~feagher could be avoided! Stock made
no demands whatsoever upon Meagher. In fact after
Meagher learned of the quitclaim from Stock to IIill
he wrote to Stock about it and questioned his motives.
Stock recei.ved this letter but did not. answer it.
No oil had been discovered at the time. Meagher's
suit to quiet title had already been filed. Stock was
named as a defendant in that .suit. After the suit was
com1nenced he executed his release in Meagher's favor.
Yet Stock, while plotting with Juhan to avoid his own
release, sat by in silence even after inquiry fron1
Meagher.
The first overt action by Stock .addressed to Meagher
by which lVIeagher could know Stock's true position ·
was not taken until August 16, 1949. This consisted
of Stock's voluntary appearance in the quiet title
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suit. Prior to that, jurisdiction over Stock, a nonresident, had not been perfected. This appearance conHisted of an answer and counter-claim in which Stock
belatedly sought to rescind his own release. This pleading was filed four years and ten n1onths after Stock
had given his release to Meagher, and nearly one year
after oil had been discovered.
It is significant that this pleading filed in Stock's
behalf was prepared by Juhan's counsel and up to the
day of the trial (March 6, 1951) Stock had never
read it.2
These are some of the facts which appellants have
seen fit to omit in their recital. There are others.
Appellants have suggested to this court that Stock
has m.ade financial contributions or commitments to'vard the expenses of drilling. So far as concerns any
interest Stock may clailn traceable back to his own
former one-half interest in the lease, this is not the
case. The true situation is that Stock and Juhan
agreed that Juhan "\Vould do what he could to squeeze
out Meagher and Stock would get one-eighth of whatever Juhan could develop out of Stock's former onehalf interest. Stock n1ade no financial con1mitn1ent in
connection with that transaction.
This is not set forth to reflect upon Juhan's counsel. It is
significant, however, that Stock looked entirely to Juhan to overcome Meagher's claim and has not ·to this day personally
espoused the elaborate legal theories upon which Juhan seeks to
overthrow Stock's release to Meagher.
2
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':rhe fa(•ts behind Stock's investment are these: Long
after Stock quitclai1ued to Juhan the privilege of litigating 'vith l\Ieagher, ·he did purchase frotn Juhan a
new participation in the deal. This occurred in July of
1948. But that acquisition was lhnited to the one-half
interest owned by Phebus. Stock himself testified that
purchase \vas designed to get him an interest, ''win,
lose or drawH in the litigation with Meagher. Stock
did pay n1oney to Juhan for that participation, but the
Phebus line of title to one half of the lessee's rights is
not under attack by Meagher and any expenditure of
Stock for a portion thereof has no bearing whatsoever
upon the present ownership of the one-half interest
with which this litigation is concerned; "the one-half interest formerly owned by Stock and transferred to
Meagher by Stock.
The foregoing facts take on substantial stature when
one considers the pious plea for "equity" which has
been made in this case in Stock's behalf.
In vie'v of the numerous points raised by appellants in their brief, respondent Meagher requests the
C'ourt 's indulgence if the recital of additional factual
matters is set forth in connection with the argument
of the particular legal points to which they are relevant.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS.

To enable the court to readi1y locate Meagher's comJnents with respect to the nine points raised by appellants, each is set forth below, and in the argument, in
the order presented by appellants. The tenth point
hereunder is raised by respondent:
1. The court did not err in permitting Meagher
to amend his reply to meet issues raised by
defendants' pleadings.
2. Meagher is the real party in interest for the
purposes of this litigation.
3. Meagher is neither guilty of laches nor is he
estopped to assert his interest in the leasehold.
4. Meagher is guilty of no fraudulent conduct
whatsoever.
5. The Stock to Meagher transfer
by a legal consideration.

IS

supported

6. The Stock to ~feagher transfer may not be
rescinded on the ground of mistake.
7. The Stock to Meagher transfer, viewed as a
surrender, is a valid relinquishment of Stock's
interest in the lease to Meagher.
(a) The transfer is nqt affected by the provisions of Exhibit A 5, the modification of
the lease.
(b) The transfer does not lack consideration.
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(c) Stock 'vas fully e1npowered t.o surrender to

the reversioner, ~{eaghel\ \vhatever interest
he had in the leasehold.
(d) :J[eagher "·a~ the o'vner of the reversionary rights in the property and as such was
eligible to receive a surrender.
S. The Stock to l\Ieagher transfer, viewed as a
conveyance, i8 effective to transfer Stock's interest in the lease to ~leagher.

9. :Jieagher ·s lando,vner's royalty interest can be
adjudicated in this action.
10. Stock is barred by laches from asserting rescission of his transfer to Meagher.

ARGUMENT.
1.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING MEAGHER
TO AMEND HIS REPLY TO MEET ISSUES RAISED BY
DEFENDANTS' PLEADINGS.

It is correct that when this quiet title action was
commenced on October 17, 1944, Stock had not then
transferred his one-half interest to Meagher. This was
done on October 21, 1944, four days after the co1nplaint
was filed.
It is also true that l?hebus had not then transferred
his one-half interest in the lease to Juhan. · This trans-
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fer to Juhan (A-18) was not given until January 19,
1945. Also, Stock had not then made his second transfer of his one-half interest (A-19) to Juhan's man
Charles Hill. This occurred on April 14, 1945.
T-Iowever, before Juhan answered, these two docuInents, upon which his elaims depend, had been executed. His answer asserts all lessee's rights in the
lease and asks the court to affirmatively declare his
interests to be superior to any claim of Meagher.
In this situation Juhan's answer becomes· an affirmative pleading seeking to quiet a title acquired by him
subsequent to the filing of the co~plaint. In reply to
such a pleading, Meagher is entitled to set forth any
title he acquired prior to the filing of Juhan's pleading. This issue was argued and briefed before the trial
court, and neither in the court below nor here have
appellants met the authorities submitted in support of
Meagher's position. We will briefly summarize them
here:
Where the defendant in a quiet title suit seeks affirmative relief and raises issue of title acquired by him
after commencement of the suit, the plaintiff can n1eet
such issues by proof of title acquired by him after suit
is flied and prior to the time of filing defendant's
pleading.
Rowley v. Davis ( 1917), 34 Cal. App. 184, 167
Pac. 162.
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In the aboY~ rase, a suit to quiet title, defendant
set up a record title clain1 and sought affirmative relief. The plaintiff \Yns pertnitted to resist the defendant's affir1nativ~ clain1s by proof of title acquired by
plaintiff subseq11ent to filing the complaint but prior
to the filing of defendant'~ pleading. rrhe decision in
favor of plaintiff was affirined by the appellate court
and a petition for hearing in the Supreme Court was
denied. The appellate opinion contains the following
explanation of the rule and the reasons for it:
''Referring to the record thus presented, appellant insists that the judgment should be reversed
because the action n1ust be determined upon the
facts as they existed at the time of the commenceInent of the suit, 'Rowley not having pleaded any
after-acquired title.' It is true that the plaintiff
did not attempt to supplement his complaint by a
statement showing title aequired after the action.
was commenced. Also it is the law that he would
not have a right to file a supplemental complaint
showing after-acquired title, if in fact he had not
title at the con1mencernent of the action. (Citing
cases.) But the cross-complaint of the defendant
Davis was not filed until after plaintiff Rowley
had acquired the title of the defendant and crossdefendant Alice Huse. By filing that cross-complaint the cross-cornplainant tendered new issues
whereby he set up a cause of action which. relates
to the date of filing the cross-complaint. This he
had the right to do. (Citing cases.) The fact that
Rowley had at that tin1e acquired the title of
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Mrs. Huse was available to him as a defense to
the cross-action and was provable under his claim
of ownership as pleaded by his answer to the
cross-complaint. If this were not so, a defendant
by filing a cross-complaint would be able to prevent the plaintiff fro1n dismissing an action which
had been prematurely brought, and might thereby
obtain 'on the merits' a judgment which possibly
would permanently cut out the just rights of the
plaintiff by preventing hiln from thereafter litigating the title with the cross-complainant. We therefore are of the opinion that the judgment should
be sustained, if the evidence is sufficient to support
Rowley's title as existing at the time of filing the
cross-complaint.''
Also see Orloff v. Mosher (1944), 64 Cal. App. (2d)
6, 147 Pac. (2d) 675, holding that if one of the defendants conveys his interest to plaintiff pending suit,
and another defendant files a pleading seeking to quiet
his title, the court will test the plaintiff's title as of
the time of filing the latter pleading.
There can be no question that defendant Juhan has
sought affirmative relief in this action even though his
pleading is not designated as a counter-claim.
In Harmon v. Yeager, 103 Utah 208, 134 Pac. (2d)
695, it was held that if defendant files a pleading which
contains the essential allegations of a cause of action
it will be treated as a counter-claim no matter how
designated and plaintiff will be obliged to· reply to it.
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.A-\lso in Perego r. Dod,oe, 9 Utah B, 33 Pac. 221, it
"'"as held in a quiet title aetion that if defendants deny
the 1naterinl allegations of the romplaint, clahn title
in then1selyes and pray that it be quieted as against
plaintiff~. they 1nay recover upon proof of such allegations regardless of ho'v their pleading is designated.
Also see:
Dun.hanz D. Traris, 25 Utah 65, 69 Pac. 468;
nllender v. Ct·ossfield Oil Syndicate (Mont.
1929), 275 Pac. 273;
Juster v. Juster (N. Dak. 1949), 37 N.W. (2d)
879.
1

(

Turning to Juhan's answer, ,,. e find the affirmative
allegation that he owns all of the lessee's rights in
the lease and prays that his interests be ratified, confirmed and declared valid. It is significant that Juh8,n
had no interest in the lease so far as concerns oil when
the con1plaint was filed or until J anua.ry 19, 1945, when
he acquired the Phebus one-half interest (A-18). Then
on April 14, 1945, his representative Hill acquired
the abortive quitclaim front Stock ( A-19). These are
the two docu1nents upon which Juhan must rest his
claims to any interest in the lease so far as concerns
oil. One deals 'vith the Phebus line of title which respondent Meagher does not oppose, the other seeks to
revive the Stock line of title which, however, had previously been interrupted by Stock's transfer to Meagher
of October, 1944 (A-30).
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Meagher does not object to the fact that Juhan in
his answer sets forth titles acquired by hirn subsequent
to commencement of the action. The authorities support a defendant's right to do this.
Rucker v. Jackson, 180 Ala. 109, 60 So. 139;
Nor.ris v. United Mineral Products Co. (Wyo.),
158 Pac. (2d) 679;
Lortz v. Rose (Mo.), 145 S.W. (2d) 385.
In Norris v. United Mineral Products, Co., supra,
an action to quiet title, defendant had acquired rights
in the property after the complaint was filed but prior
to filing answer. The court considered the rule in ejectment where this procedure is available to a defendant
and said:
''If a new ti tie acquired during the pendency of
an ejectment action may be interposed by the defendant as a defense to that action, it is difficult to
perceive 'vhy it may not be done in a suit to quiet
title. * * * The law does not look with approval
upon a multiplicity of suits and where all matters
in controversy between the parties as to the title
or possession of real property may well be concluded in one action that should be done.''
The above authorities mere~y show that ,Juhan was
entitled to bring into this action the interests he
claimed in the lease even though acquired after coinplaint was filed. U :rider such circumstances, it u1ust
follow that Meagher can plead anything which 'vill
defeat or minimize Juhan's claim to an after-acquired
title. Meagher's first reply denied any validity to
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Juhan's claim. Hi~ ulthnate reply n1erely alleged that
Juhan ~s rights w·ere of lesse'r e~rtent than the interests
asserted.
Our conunents with respect to Juhan also apply to
Phebus. 3
So far as concerns Stock, there can be no dispute.
His ans\ver 'vhen finally filed in 1949 alleges that he
claims an interest in the lease adverse to the claims
of ~feagher, and his counterclain1 seeks to rescind his
transfer to ~!eagher.
The background bringing into issue these leasehold
interests has already been explained. Meagher, in the
original trial, contended that the lease had been forfeited or abandoned and therefore any question of
ownership of interests therein was, of course, inunaterial. After the appeal and the determination by this
court that Meagher's interests were subject to the
outstanding interests in the leasehold, it was entirely
proper in the further proceedings which were ordered
by this court for Meagher to set forth the limitations
upon the interests in the leasehold claimed by his adversaries and the existence of such interests in hi1nself.
The amended reply 1nerely serves this purpose.
art is not clear on what basis appellant Phebus remains in this
litigation. It is apparent from the record that he has disposed
of all interest which he ever had in the property. However, he
was belatedly permitted to adopt the answer of Juhan as his
own ( R. 43) and in so far as he does thereby remain in the
action he, of course, accedes to and approves of all of ,Juhan's
claims.
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There can be ·no dispute that a plaintiff who clain1s
a fee simple in a quiet title action but proves ownership of some lesser estate will not be foreclosed from a
decree adjudicating that lesser estate.

In State v. Rolio, 71 Utah 91, 262 Pac. 987, this court
said:
''In an action to quiet title the plaitiff 1nay
allege his title, ownership and possession in general terms, and thereafter 1nay prove whatever title
he has.''
See also:
Tarpey v. Dese-rt Salt ,Co., 5 Utah 205, 14 Pac.
338;
Gordon v. Oadwalader, 172 Cal. 254, 156 Pac. 471;
Nadeau v. Texas Company (Mont. 1937), 69 Pac.
. (2d) 586.
The development of this litigation has required
Meagher to reduce the quantum of his claim but his
basic controversy with appellants has .never changed.
Since the day the original complaint was filed, Meagher
has claimed interests. in this land in opposition to appellants. All appellants ·have set forth their claims and
have asked for determination thereof. Those interestf'
cannot be determined unless their lhnitations are also
determined. The second trial has been conducted in
conformity with the prior mandate of this court. It has
determined who owns what interests in this property,
heeding always the decree of this court that the lease
itself was neither forfeited nor abandoned.
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2. MEAGHER IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST FOR TH.E

PURPOSES OF THIS LITIGATION.

On January :27, 1948, ~[eagher quitclaimed to his
children all of his right, title and interest in the property excepting his lando,vner 's royalty (A -22).
That conveyance 'vas intended to be just what it
purports to be, namely, a transfer of whatever Meagher
had, excepting only his landowner's royalty. It was
made during the pendenry of this action and more than
three years after Stock had given his release to
Meagher.
Prior to his conveyance to his children, Meagher was
the sole o'vner of the interests transferred and as such
was the legal and equitable real party in interest. After
that transfer ~Ieagher 'vas acting as trustee for his
children in the prosecution of this litigation and as such
was the legal real party in interest.
The provisions of Section 104-3-19 Utah Code Annotated, quoted in appellants' brief clearly support
Meagher's right to continue this action in his nan1e,
and Rule 25 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
also cited by appellants sets forth the same principle.

Smith Land Co. v. Johnson, 100 Utah 342, 107
Pac. (2d) 158;
Brighant City v. Chase, 30 Utah 410, 85 Pac. 436;
Lowell v. Parkinson, 4 Utah 64, 66, 6 Pac. 58;
Firman v. Bateman, 2 Utah 268;
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Cleverdon v. Gray, 62· Cal. App. (2d) 612, 145
Pac. (2d) 95.
In fa~t, in pleading to the Stock answer and counterclaim Meagher states that he and his grantees have
elected to continue the action in his name. As appellants point out, no proof of this was made at the trial,
but surely there is no requirement that this election is
an issuable and essential fact that must be alleged and
proved! The statute states that the action can be continued in the name of the original party but if substitution is desir~d court approval is necessary. Meagher's
pleading merely notified all concerned that l\1eagher
and his grantees had made the election which required
neither proof nor order.
Appellants' argument seeks to limit the interest
passed under the unqualified quitclaim deed fron1
Meagher to his children by an obscure inference as to
the state of Meagher's mind dependent upon the status
of the pending litigation at the time of his conveyance.
It is true that when Meagher made the transfer to his
children he may not have known the legal extent of his
interest in the property for the decision of this court
concerning the leasehold had just been rendered and
Meagher's petition for rehearing was pending. But one
thing is certain. He did transfer to his children whatever he had, excepting only his landowner's royalty.
Even now, the final determination and definition of
Meagher's interest 'vill not' he known until this litip;a-
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tion is finally roncluded. The case of Foster v. Cont.
Nat. Bk. of Boston (1906), 76 N.E. 338, cited by appellants, involved an an1endment which sought to convert
an action for injunetion into a suit to recover for
monies paid. The decision points out and appellants
concede that two separate and distinct rauses of action
were involved. In the case at bar, however, the amendment to ~feagher's reply did not bring in a new cause
of action; nor did it change this suit from an action
to quiet title into any other form of action; nor did it
add to the litigation any property not previously involved. The amended reply sought merely to limit
the issues to that portion of the litigation which had
not been determined, namely, to the determination of
the ownership of the outstanding interests.
One minor issue remains under this point: In describing Meagher's quitclaim deed in connection with the
transfer to his children, appellants' brief at page 23
states:
"We do not concede that a leasehold interest
can be transferred by quitclaim deed *
And on page 28 it is stated:
"The document itself, unorthodox in its form as
a transfer of an oil and gas leasehold interest

... ,

This suggestion baffles us. Surely counsel must know
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ests. It is ·frequently employed when lessees transfer
back to landowners once they have decided not to conduct additional exploratons and desire to aid the landowner in clearing his title. Similarly, it is frequently
employed to transfer leasehold interests from one person to another where the grantor desires to avoid any
implication of warranty of title. A mere cursory review of the cases in any oil state discloses the common
use of the quitclaim deed in dealing with leasehold interests.
Thus when Meagher decided to transfer his interests in these lands to his children, knowing that the
nature and ~xtent of his interests were disputed and
in litigation, what better method of conveyance could
have been employed than a simple quitclaim deed~ And
finally note how appellants in their inter se transactions used the quitclaim, e.g., Stock to. Hill (A-19),
Hill to Juhan (A-20), Phebus to Juhan (A-18), Juhan
to Stock (A-23), and Juhan to Equity (A-21).
We respectfully submit that appellants dangerously
approximate the presentation of a frivolous claim when
they seek to 1nake any point of the fact that during
the pendency of this litigation Meagher saw fit to
transfer his interest in the subject matter to his children.
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MEAGHER IS NEITHER GUILTY OF LACHES NOR IS HE
ESTOPPED TO ASSERT HIS INTEREST IN THE LEASE-

8.

HOLD.

. A.ppellants continually hnply that l\ieagher 's activities '"ere InotiYnted by the di~eovery of oil on these
lands whirh oeeurred during the pendency of this litigation. Thi~ is shnply not the fact. The only thing
'vhich has altered ~[eagher ·~ contentions since the
complaint 'vas filed is the decision of this court holding
that the original lease \Yas neither forfeited nor abandoned. ,,~hen the con1plaint was filed Meagher believed
and asserted that the old lease 'vas a nullity. Accordingly~ he alleged that he was the owner .of the fee
simple and requested a decree establishing that the
claims of defendants "·ere groundless. When this court
deter1nined that the old leasehold had vitality, it reInanded the ease for further proceedings. Meagher
then \vas required to examine the status of the various
interests and in doing so he was obliged to admit:
(1) The gas rights under the lease were still outstanding/ and (2) an undivided % of the oil rights

4

As to the gas rights, 1\ileagher believes and alleged that these
rights had been transferred back to Stock and Phebus by their
corporation, Valley Fuel Supply Co., in order to enable them to
clear the title for development by Standard Oil Company and its
subsidiaries. If this had occurred, an interest in the gas rights
would have passed to Meagher with Stock's release. But Meagher
was able to produce no documentary proof and the circumstantial evidenre developed at the trial, although substantial, was
neve1theless held insufficient to overcon1e the record title possessed by Juhan.
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were still outstanding. The gas rights had passed to
.Juhan by the assignment from Valley Fuel Supply
Company (A-17). The outstanding lj2 of the oil rights
had passed to Juhan fro1n Phebus by the quitclaim
deed of January 19, 1945 (A-1.8).
But as to the remaining lj2 of the oil rights-the
portion formerly owned by Stock-Meagher was the
owner. He had obtained this interest from Stock by
the release of Octo her 21, 1944 (A-30). Any claim of
anyone else as to this % interest must come only
through the quitclaim of April 14, 1945 (A-19) from
Stock to Charles S. Hill (Juhan's man). That quitclaim can only have effect if the release 'vhich Stock
gave 1\feagher six 1nonths before can be avoided.
The controversy over the rights in these lands had
been narrowed by this court '.s decision, but there was
still a substantial controversy. The appellants claimed
the entire leasehold rights. The claims of appellants
exceeded their actual interests. Meagher was free to
prove that he owned the remaining leasehold interests.
Appellants now charge ~feagher with laches predicated upon the interval 'vhieh elapsed between the
issuance of the remittitur from this court on March 16,
1948, and Meagher's next move in the trial court which
was a motion filed April 22, 1949. There was no such
delay. Appendix B of "significant events" contained
in appellants' brief fails to note that after the remittitur issued rnore litigation ensued and actually the
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(lase 'vas brought to the Supren1P Court for the second
time. .As noted in the trial court's opinion: '• Then
caine the eonfu~ion, induced by the defendants (other
than Stock)~ resulting· frou1 this eourt 's entry of an
unnecessar~~ and invalid •Order \:a eating and Setting
Aside Decree .A.s To Certain Defendants', the obtaining of the ruling of this court upon that act which
occupied all parties until, at least N ove1nber 8, 1948,
'vhen the decision of the Supreme .Court in 198 Pac.
(2d) 173 was filed, and n1ore certainly until February
8, 1949, 'vhen this court, upon the suggestion of the
Supre1ne Court, filed its Order Setting Aside Judgment, thus clearing the record for the further proceedings directed by that court.'' There was thus a wait
from .February 8, 1949 to April 22, 1949, before Meagher acted in the trial court.
We trust it will not violate the record to point
out that re~pondent l\Ieagher obtained additional counsel during this interval. Certainly the court will take
judiGial notice of the fact that time is necessary for
new counsel to becon1e familiar with a case of this
character.
~rhus

when the facts ·are stated accurately, it becomes evident that there were no substantial delays
at all in the prosecution of Meagher's claims.
Moreover Meagher was under no obligation to act
quiekly at the ri~k of losing his rights. Certainly appellants Ntock and Juhan were fully aware of MeagSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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her's interest in the leasehold. Stock had conveyed
it to Meagher and ,Juhan had brought Stock back into
the deal under a private understanding expressly contingent upon the elin1ination of Meagher's interest. As
\vill be pointed out in the argument concerning estoppel, Meagher had no obligation and indeed had no
right to prevent the drilling which was conducted
during this period. But when litigation is pending and
a lis pendens is on file (A-42) we know of no case
where a party has lost his rights in the absence of a
motion to dismiss predicated upon the usual statutory
grounds requiring dismissal for want of prosecution.
When the original complaint was filed these appellants knew that ~{eagher claimed they had no interest
in the lands. After the appeal was determined and
the case was remanded for further proceedings, these
appellants must have known that Meagher in those
proceedings would assert his right to an undivided 1h
interest in the lease.
Finding of . Fact No. 1 states : ''There has been no
undue or substantial delay in the assertion of his claim
or in the prosecution of this litigation by Meagher."
The trial court did not err in denying appellants' claim
of laches.
Let us now turn to the allege} estoppel. We have
carefully scrutinized appellants' brief to ascertain each
speeific ground upon which estoppel is charged. These
assertions and Meagher's answers are as follows:
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..:\ppellants say: Meagher failed to assert his claim
under the Stoek release 'vhen he receiYPd it. We answer: ~I eagher 's original, although erroneous, contention "·as that the lease \\·as Yoid. In such event
Stock's release 'vould have nterged in ~Ieagher's fee
and proof of that interest by !!leagher 'vould have been
entirely ilntna terial.
Appellants also ~ay: :\leagher is estopped because
he first took the position that the lease was void and
now seeks to establish an i1tterest in it. We answer:
There is nothing inconsistent, unconscionable, or unusual for a lando,vner to assert a greater estate than
the proof supports. The greater includes the lesser.
Conversely, appellants could not be misled by the fact
that ~leagher originally asserted that they had no
interest and later (after the decision of this court)
conceded in his amended reply that appellants owned
a partial interest. Appellants could not be prejudiced
by a change in the pleadings by which Meagher conceded something to them. However, the point is that
throughout the litigation appellants kne'v that any
clailns they asserted were vigorously contested by
Meagher. The fact that originally he said they had no
interest and later said they had only a fractional interest, raises no basis for estoppel.
Appellants claim that Meagher is estopped by accepting the fruits of the first decree. We answer: This
argtnnent is sintply beyond comprehension. We know
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of" no decree in this litigation which has as ·yet yielded
any benefits to Meagher. Surely appellants do not
refer to the original decree of the trial court 'vhich
was reversed. Possibly appellants have in mind the
elementary principle that estoppel by decree can only
arise when the party against whom it is asserted has
derived son1e benefit from a previous decree. This is
good law but it has no application to the facts of
this case.
Appellants assert that Meagher is estopped, urging
that he did not tin1ely assert his claims to an mterest in the lease after this court determined that
the lease was valid and existing. This has been answered in our discussion above with respect to laches.
Appellants argue that Meagher is estopped because
he knew that Stock executed a quitclaim to Charles
S. Hill (A-19) some time after Stock had released to
Meagher. The short answer to this is that Meagher
took all appropriate action to advise Stock of
Meagher's position and to ascertain Stock's intentions.
The quiet title suit had already been commenced.
Meagher had already obtained a release from Stock.
But he did more, he 'vrote to Stock (A-39) and asked
why the quitclaim had been given to Hill. He pointed
out that he, Meagher, was no"r the owner of Stock's
for1ner interest in the property. He pointed out that
deeds of this kind "just rness up an abstract of title".
He also pointed out the confusion the quitclaim would
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cause in vie",. of the obligation of Stock to reconvey
son1e outstanding lando,vners' royalty. This was positive aetion on ~1eagher's part and is entirely inconsistent 'vith appellants' clahn that l[eap;her led Stock
to believe that l\Ieagher had 'va.ived any rights or
rlailns or that lieagher acquiesced in Stock's quitclaim
to Hill. Certainly upon receipt of this letter it was
Stock~s duty to speak up if he intended to repudiate
his for1ner release. Stock received Meagher's letter.
What did he do? He simply ignored it. It was not
answered.
. We are eonvinced that no impropriety would be
intentionally indulged by any of our opposing counsel.
But in discussing this point we must call attention to
an inadvertence which involves a gross misstatement
of the record. At page 33 of appellants' brief, in
referring to the release Stock gave to Meagher, they
say: .. Notwithstanding it was repudiated by Stock
six month~ after it was obtained, still respondent made
no complaint." When appellants say that "respondent
made no complaint" they overlook the vigorous complaint addressed to Stock in the letter (A-39) discussed
above. Thus the facts are that even though 1\tfeagher
did co1nplain and did ask Stock for an explanation,
Stock remained secretive as to his intentions.
Appellants seek to estop Meagher by a remarkably
obtuse line of reasoning predicated upon the fact that
Meagher transferred his interest in the property to his
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children pending the litigation. We answer that no
inference can be drawn that a n1an "raives any rights
in favor of strangers merely because he transfers his
interest in property to his children.
Appellants argue that Meagher is estopped because
he did not try to stop appellants and their assigns
fro1n drilling on the property. We answer: Once this
court determined that the oil and gas lease had not
been extinguished any party having a portion of the
lessee's rights also has a clear right to conduct operations on the property. When two or more persons
own an interest in land, either can deYelop it. When
two or more persons own lessee's interests in an oil
lease either can develop under it.
In Buchanan v. Jencks, 38 R. I. 443, 96 Atl. 307, the

court said:
"A tenant in con1mon has the right to divest
himself of his entire interest in the common property· and _thus bring into association with his
former co-tenants one who has theretofore been
a stranger to the title, and this he may do independently and 'vithout the consent of such cotenants.''
In Prairie Oil d!i Gas Co. v. Allen ( C.C.A. 8th), 2 Fed.
( 2d) 566, the court held that 'vhere property is held by
tenants in comn1on each has the right 'vithout consent
of any other to explore for and produce oil and gas. At
page 571 the court said:
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Tenant~

in ron1n1on a rP the o'vners of the
substance of the estate. They n1ay n1ake such
reasonable use of the co1nmon property as iH
necessary to enjoy the benefit~ and value of such
o'vner5hip. Since an estate of a co-tenant in a
Inine or oil 'Yell can only be enjoyed by removing
the products thereof, the taking of 1nineral from
a mine and the extraction of oil fro1n an oil well
are the use and not the destruction of the estate.
This being true, a tenant in comn1on without the
consent of his co-tenant, . has the right to develop
and operate the co1nmon property for oil and gas
and for that purpose may drill wells and erect
necessary plants.''
4

'

In Dav-is r. Byrd, 185 S.W. (2d) 866, one co-tenant
sought to restrain the lessee of another co-tenant from
developing the property under a mineral lease. In
approving the trial court's dismissal of the petition,
the opm1on .says :
'' Injtmction will not lie at the instance of one
eo-tenant to restrain another co-tenant or his
lessee from conducting mining operations on the
comn1on property unless it appears that such
tenant in con1mon or his lessee has excluded or
prevented the .complaining co-tenant from exercising the sa1ne rights and privileges.''
The sa1ne rule applies between co-lessees as distinguished fro1n co-owners of the fee. In Allies Oil Co.
v. Ayer.s, 152 La. 19; 92 So. 720, one co-lessee drilled an
oil well and obtained production after his co-lessee had
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participating co-lessee was entitled to one-half of the
production less one-half of the expense, the court
saying:
''For to the extent that they were invested by
the owner with the right to sever the oil from the
land, plaintiff and defendant occupied towards
each other exactly the same relations as if they
owned the land in common.''
Such action by a co-tenant or co-lessee merely imposes upon the acting party an obligation to account
to the other for his share of the net production. The
drilling, not being an adverse act,. cannot be stopped
by the other party in interest. One cannot be estopped
for failing to prevent action which one has no right
to enjoin.
Meagher had already given formal and adequate
notice to all concerned that he claimed interests in the
property adverse to the interests claimed by them.
What better notice could be given than the pendency
of an unfinished quiet ti tie action' The lis pendens
filed May 4, 1945, notified not only these appellants
but the world that the property rights in this land
were in litigation and until that litigation was concluded no one, much less the litigants, had any basis
for assuming that Meagher was willing to accept less
than his lawful interest.
The equity platitudes which follow in the remainder
of this portion of appellants' brief tempt us to vio-
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late the restraints to 'vhich the dignity of this court
is en ti tied.
Here 'Ye have Stock and Juhan asserting a title
based upon a quitclaiin executed six 1nonths after the
same interest had been transferred to }Ieagher. They
not only kne""" of the transfer but Juhan's representative took Stock's quitclain1 with the express understanding that Stock 'vould receive nothing unless
they could subsequently avoid the prior transfer to
Meagher. 5
Appellants called the Stock to Meagher transfer an
H after
thought." There is no basis for this. It is
true :hieagher did not consider he 'vould need it to
establish his rights for he thought he owned a fee
simple. But it was no "after thought" once the
various interests in the leasehold became relevant.
Appellants would set aside the release as ''a writing
ahnost forgotten.'' Forgotten by whom 1 Certainly not
by ~Ieagher. Certainly not by Juhan or Stock. Their
deal 'vas that Stock would get something only if this
"writing aln1o~t forgotten" could be rescinded.
These 1nen 'vho now plead that ''they at every moment
acted as reasonable men" and say: "There is not a
5The slight value Stock placed upon his own chances of avoiding the prior release is eloquently proved by the fact that all he
was to get fro1n his quitclaim to Juhan via Hill was one-eighth
of whatever Juhan could wrest from ~ieagher. Stock said in
effect: "Here is nothing, but if you can make something out of
it you can have seven-eights of it."
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scintilla of evidence to put in question their good faith
and honest purpose,'' are the same men ~ho realized
for years that rescission of the Stock release would
be necessary for them to control the entire leasehold.
Did they take any action to rescind the document?
They did not. When Meagher learned of the Stock to
Hill quitclaim and recognized that was confusing to the
title, he wrote to Stock about it. Did Stock reply and
assert his position' He did not. On the contrary, these
men of ''good faith and honest purpose'' have hoped all
along that the ''writing almost forgotten'' would be forgotten. But when the relevancy of this document became apparent it was urged by Meagher and then for
the first and only time Stock and his associates made
a belated effort to rescind it.
They talk as though Meagher sat by and took no
action until after oil was discovered. This is not true.
He commenced this proceeding four years before oil
was discovered and has never dismissed it. But Stock
is guilty of the very charge which is leveled at
Meagher. When he n1ade his deal with Juhan in 1945,
Stock knew nothing would come of it unless his prior
transfer to Meagher could be set aside. That was a
few months after Meagher had commenced this suit.
Yet Stock made no move to set it aside for four years
and ten months after execution. Moreover, Stock
waited for eleven months after oil was discovered before he took his first step. It was Stock, not Meagher,
who deferred action until discovery of oil.
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The authoritie~ cited in this section of appellants'
brief need not be review'ed. R·P~pondent aecepts their
principles. They even apply to the facts of this case,
but only in this "~ay: the cited cases de1nonst.rate why
Stock cannot rescind the release he gave to Meagher.
But these authorities afford appellants nothing in
support of their elahn that ~Ieagher is estopped or
·barred by laches. for the facts upon which these cases
depend do not exist as against 1Ieagher.
Estoppel requires at least two elements, (1) representation, and (2) reliance. The above comments show
the complete absence of any representation by Meagher
indicating any intention on his part to forego his rights
and clahns. This alone 'vould preclude estoppel.
But in addition, even if son1e representation could
be conceived, the other essential element-reliance-is
not present.
We find no contention that any action by Meagher
involves an estoppel with respect to any defendant
other than Stock. But the testimony develops a remarkably clear absence of any reliance by Stock upon ariy
act or lack of action by Meagher.
First \\~e must find what it 'vas Stock did which
can even be claimed to have been done in reliance
upon 1\ileagher 's actions. 6 IIere we find one fact only:
The effect of the contrary to fact recitals contained in the
Stock to 1\:Ieagher transfer is not treated under the subject of
estoppel. It is fully discussed in the se~.tions on fraud and mistake, infra.
6
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In ·1948 Stock purchased from Juhan (A-23) an interest in the lease. It will be noted that Stock claims
that his present interest in the lease is not derivative
from the one-eighth contingent interest he was to get
under the Stock-Hill-tT uhan deal of 1945. According
to Stock that interest was returned to Juhan in 1948
in the deal by which Stock for $19,500.00 received a onefourth interest from Juhan. Further, Stock's own testinlony discloses that his purchase in 1948 was not made
because Stock thought. Meagher had decided to forego
his claims, but on the contrary was made to switch
Stock's interest in the lease from the small contingency
he had .saved from the Stock line of title into an
interest descending through the line of title from
Phebus (Appendix B infra). Stock testified that when
he obtained the 1948 quitclaim from Juhan he paid
$19,500.007 and gave back to Juhan the old one-eighth
contingent interest which Stock retained under the 1945
Stock-Hill-Juhan deal. Stock also testified that he regards the interest he acquired in 1948 as traceable to
the Phebus line of title, and when that deal was negotiated he was trying to get an interest in the lease
''win, lose or draw in the case with Meagher'' By such
a switch of interests, Stock obviously was trying to put
himself into a position that would be free of any claim

7Note that $6500.00 of the $19,500.00 was used to pay Phebus
for the quitclaim (A-18) he had given Juhan on January 19,
1945. See letter agreement between Juhan and Stock dated tTuly
9, 1948 (A-51).
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Meagher n1ight assert. 8 This is a far cry fro1n reliance
upon any representation that l\1:eagher had given up
his claims .
..c\.ppellants' brief does not particularize as to the
manner or extent of Stock'8 participation in the expenses of drilling. This i~ beeause there was no conlmitment by Stoek to participate in these expenses
prior to ,July of 1948 at Vt'"hich ti1ne Stock made his
deal for a nev.-r interest as discussed above.
The trial court opinion com1nents upon this as follows: · •If Stock himself had expended any money for
develop1nent since the action 'vas filed (which the
record does not specifically indicate) he, along with all
other parties to this · action, dealt with the property
subject to the exigencies of this action and may not
assert such expenditures as a change of position upon
which to base an estoppel" (Emphasis added).
The following statement from 31 Corp. Jur. Sec.
p. 267, par. 71, is sufficient to illustrate the wellestablished legal principles which dispose of the point:
''It is an essential element of equitable estoppel
that the person invoking it has been influenced· by,
and has relied on, the representation or conduct of
8 It

is not material to Meagher's point whether the Stoek-Juhan
deal in 1948 did or did not give Stock an interest solely traceable
to the Phebus line of title. Meagher's point is that such is
Stock's explanation of that deal. If that was his intention ,and
he claims it 'vas, he could not possibly have been motivated by
any belief that Meagher had given up. Therefore, there was no
action taken hy Stock in reliance upon anything attributable to
Meagher.
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the person sought to be f•stopped * * • The person
asserting the estoppel n1ust have been actually nlisled to his injury, by the acts, conduct, words, or
silence of the person claiming to be estopped. There
can be no equitable estoppel where the complainant's act appears to be rather the result of his
own wil1 or judgment than the product of what
defendant did or represented. The act must be induced by, and be the immediate or proximate result of, the conduct or representation, which 1nust
be such as the party claiming the estoppel had a
right to rely on. The representation or conduct
must of itself have been sufficient to warrant the
action of the party claiming the estoppel.''
Finding of Fact No. 36 deals with the factual phase
of this issue, as follows : ''No action, lack of action,
or change of position by any defendant was induced
by or undertaken in reliance upon any action, ,inaction, or representation, express or implied, attributable to Meagher; nor did any defendant take or
refrain from taking any action due to any misconception of fact or of law."
The following portion of Finding of Fact No. 37
is also in point: "Neither said drilling operations nor
any expenditures incurred in connection therewith
were induced by ·or were undertaken in reliance upon
any representation, express or in1plied, attributable to
Meagher. Stock and all other parties to this action
dealt with the property .subject to the exigencies of
this litigation and with full knowledge that Meagher
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asserted infer~sts substantially
rlahns of each defendant."

111

conflict with the

Conclusion of La"· No. 15 rorreetly states: '' ~teagher
is neither estopped nor barred by laches from asserting
the interests to "·hirh he is entitled as herein set
forth.''

4.

MEA·GBER IS GUILTY OF NO FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT WHATSOEVER.

Appellants devote separate sections of their brief to
clanns of mistake and lack of consideration. But in
their argun1ent under the serious charge of fraud,
· these other issues are literally brought in by the heels,
Recognizing this they say, ''whether it be called fraud
or 1nistake is of little consequence, the result is the
san1e.'' The same argument could be urged to distinguish murder fron1 an accidental killing, but the
legal consequences are different.
We agree that the result is the same In the sense
that either fraud or actionable mistake gives rise to
the clahn of rescission. In both situations that claim
can be lost by a party who, being fully a"\vare of his
claim, conceals his decision to assert it, lets years
elapse and withholds any action until great changes in
the value of the property have occurred. However, the
foregoing considerations are in the nature of confession
and avoidanee and are asserted by Meagher in Section
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10 of this argument. At this· point Meagher will demonstrate there was no fraud. 9
The charge of fraud is a serious accusation. Its
eletnents are substantially identical with those of deceit. It jnvolves an intentional over-reaching of one
party b~· another. The motives of the fraudulent party
are of great in1portance. His acts rnust have been
conunitted with the intention of deceiving the other
party and leading him into a prejudicial position. The
party defrauded must have been fooled. He must have
relied upon the deceptive activities of the fraudulent
one.
The cases reciting the elements of fraud are legion.
However, there is no substantial variation in the doc~
trine as applied in the various states. The elements
are set forth as follows in 37 C.J.S., page 215:
''Comprehensively stated, the elements of actionable fraud consist of: (1) representation; (2)
its falsity; ( 3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth;
( 5) his intent that it should be acted on by the
person and in the n1anner reasonably contemplated; ( 6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity;
(7) his reliance on its truth; (8) his right to rely
thereon; and (9) his consequent and proximate
injury.''
These are elementary principles. They are well
known to appellants. But they do not care to grapple
9Section 5 is devoted to the issue of consideration. Section 6
argues the issue of mistake.
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,vith the hurden "·hieh these essential elen1ents hupose
upon one n1aking the grave eharge of fraud. lnstead,
they n1erely eonfuse the issues hoping this court can
be induced to forget the 1nany ronditions which one
n1ust mPet before a eourt 'vill brand a litigant with
the ~ tign1a of being a cheat.
When the fraud section of the appellants' brief is
analyzed it~ factual foundation boils down to this:
Stock o\vned an undivided 'l2 of the lessee's rights in
lands o\vned by ~Ieagher. For a period of 15 years
Stock and his co-lessee had done nothing about it or
at least their efforts to develop the property had accoinplished nothing. ~Ieagher 'vrote to Stock on January 7, 1944 (.A-26), telling him: (1) Meagher had
purchased the landowner's rights subject to outstanding royal ties and the lease; ( 2) Meagher understood
that Stock and Phebus had assigned all their rights
to one Archie Le,vis but finds no record of that assignment. (3) l\Ieagher's objective is to clear the title
of the lease because the record instruments indicate
that Stock i~ still interested; (4) Meagher requests a
release from Stock.
Ten days later a letter was written to Meagher by
L. J. I-Iinkley on behalf of Stock (A-32) acknowledging
Meagher's letter of January 7. This letter advises that
Stock will execute an instrument to clear the out:-;tanding royalties on the lease which ~'will enable you
to record sa1ne and clear the title.'' This letter does
indicate some confusion, at least in the mind of Mr.
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Hinkley, for it discusses royalties whereas Meagher's
letter ( A-26) does not diRcuss royalties but states
that Meagher's efforts are designed to ''clear the
title of the lease."
The next communication between Stock and Meagher
comes nine months later and is the letter of October
16, 1944 to Paul Stock (A-27), signed by Meagher's
daughter acting as Meagher's attorney. This letter says:
''As attorney for my father, Mr. N. J. Meagher, I have
started a quiet title suit in the District Court of
Uintah County, but I have been assured that you do
not claim any interest of any sort in the Ashley Valley
Oil field and will sign a release of any interests you
had in the past so the release may be recorded.''
The next step in the Stock-Meagher communications
was the receipt by Meagher from Stock of the release
which Meagher's daughter had enclosed in her letter
of October 16.
Note the long interval of tin1e (nine months) between Hinkley's letter to Meagher and Katherine
Meagher's letter to Stock. Note the positive manner
in which Katherine Meagher excluded any possible
inf·erence that her father was merely talking about
outstanding royalties. If there was any question in
Stock's mind as to what Meagher was talking about
after the Hinkley letter it was certainly ·clarified by
l{atherine Meagher's letter.
It is significant that appellants' brief combines the
letters to Phebus with the Stock correspondence. There
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is nothing in the record to indiea te that staten1ents
1nade to Phebus by l\{eagher \vere ever ~ommunicated
to Stock. In fact, the contrary is indicated by
Hinkley·~ letter 'vhich states that Phebus is not in
dthis part of the eonntry" and advises that "his address is so1newhere in Illinois.''
Even though "~e find nothing In the letters to
Phebus "~hirh if addressed to Stock 'vould in any way
confuse Stock a~ to ~feagher'~ intentions, we consider
it in1proper to discuss the Phebus letters in connection \vith claimed fraud upon Stock. Our real objection in this respect is that it tends to telescope the
correspondence chronologically and thereby creates an
erroneous in1pression. There were only two exchanges
of correspondence bet,veen Stock and ~ieagher. One
occurred in ,January of 1944, the other in October
of that year.
However, we can cite one of the Phebus letters to
illustrate the open 1nanner in which Meagher was
treating the 1natter 'vhen he -vvas atteinpting to clear
up his title. In this connection see Meagher's letter
of November 9, 1944 to Phebus (A-28) which frankly
concedes that ~1eagher has been solicited for a lease
on the property and assigns this as a reason for
wishing to get releases from Phebus and Stock. This
is not the type of disclosure made by one who is
deceitfully scheming to cheat another out of oil rights.
Appellants cite the testimony elicited from Stock
at the trial to indicate that Stock only thought he was
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clearing up the landowner's royalty situation when he
executed the release to Meagher. However, if such had
been the fact, after discovering the discrepancy would
not Stock have brought this to Meagher's attention~
Particularly is this true in the face of 1\ieagher's letter
to Stock written J nne 18, 1945, a few months after Stock
executed and delivered his release. In that letter
~ieagher asked Stock why he had given a quitclaim to
Hill and pointed out specifically how this transfer to
Hill would be likely to confuse the title. Certainly at
that time if Stock's release to Meagher had been given
under the misapprehension that he was merely releasing the royalties, Stock would have promptly said
so 'vhen Meagher himself brought up the subject.
But, as noted .above, Stock did not even deign to reply
to Meagher's letter of June 18, 1945 (A-39) even
though at that time he had already entered into his
plan with Juhan to upset the release he had given to
Meagher.
The fact 1s that Stock labored under no misapprehension. The trial court has declined to accept
this, the one and only excuse Stock gives for avoiding
his own document. The opinion says that Stock's counsel
seeks to attribute to Stock ''an innocence which his wide
experjence and manifest sagacity do not support".
The opinion also states that notwithstanding Stock's
testimony that he 1nerely glanced at Katherine Meagher's letter and merely ''glanced over the release itself", he could not have misunderstood their import
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·'unless he "·ns possessed of t hP innorPnee which he
~eeks to have the rourt belieYe he \Va~.'' The opinion
also points out thnt ''since Stock had no interest in
the gas rig·hts * * * and had done nothing. at all
with respect to hi~ oil rights, it would be easy to
understand his ~elf-asserted disregard of the contents
of these instrlnnents even assun1ing it to be true that
he paid slight attention to then1. The opinion goes on
·'but in either event it hardly comes with the best of
grace now after the discovery of oil and in consideration of his implication as to the \veakness of his clairn
expressed in A-19, for him to say that what he
thought he "-as releasing was merely a royalty Interest, and that he did not in tend to surrender his
n1ineral rights in the property.' ' 10
Appellants rnay not thus avoid the real significance
of Stock's testimony. The hnportance of the testilnony quoted on pages 56 and 57 of appellants' brief
is that it proves that when Stock executed the release
to 1'Ieagher, he was not relying upon any representat-ions utade by Meagher and was not misled by
any contrary to fact recitals contained in the release
itself. This point 'vill be discussed further in Section 6 which pertains to mistake.
10

In speaking of Stock's "implication as to the weakness of
his claim'' the court refers to the Stock-Hill-Juhan deal whereby
Stock transferred what he had to Juhan (via Hill) for oneeighth of what Juhan could make of it in litigation with
~Ieagher. One does not assign away a valued interest in consideration for getting one-eighth of it back.
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We agree that on the issue of fraud Meagher's
state of tnind is material and .so is Stock's. We defy
eounsel to point out any representation made by
1\feagher to Stock or anyone else which was contrary
to fact and known by Meagher to be so. We further
ehallenge appellants to show any action taken by Stock
which was taken in reliance upon any representation,
action or inaction of Meagher's.
As in the section on estoppel, appellants have cited
a number of sound authorities setting forth principles
· with which we have no dispute. Our quarrel with
them lies in their effort to bring the facts of
this case within those authorities. It certainly is not
fraud for
landowner to ask the tenants of an old
oil lease to release their interests. And when such
landowner ·only succeeds in obtaining such release
from the owner of an undivided one-half of the lessee's
rights, it certainly is not fraud for that landowner to
pursue the rights which flow to him by virtue of
that conveyance.

a

The issue has been correctly determined by the trial
court. Finding No. 38 expressly meets the claim of
fraud and determines that Meagher was not guilty
of fraudulent or deceitful conduct with respect to Stock,
or any other party to this action.
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5. THE STOCK TO MEAGHER TRANSFER IS SUPP·ORTED
BY A LEGAL CONSIDERATION.

This ~eetion of appellant~' brief attacks Finding
of Faet ~o. -t-2 '''"hieh stntes that the Stock to Meagher
transfer is supported by consideration in that Stock
was thereby excused fron1 further performance of his
obligations under the lease.
Appellant~

charge that no one has pointed out
what obligations existed w·hich Stock was bound to
perform as the o'vner of one-half of the lessee's rights.
Surely this cannot be asserted seriously. We have
never seen a lease devoid of obligations on the part
of the lessee and this one is no exception. A mere
casual reference to the lease ( A-1) and its modification (A-5) 'vill reveal obligations of the lessee in
nearly every section. See e.g. sections 5, ·6, 7 and 14 of
Exhibit A-5.
Appellants say that ~feagher could not relinquish
a portion of perforn1ance any more than Stock could
relinquish a portion of the lease. This statement is
confusing. The answer is that Stock n1ost certainly
could transfer 'vhatever interests he had to Meagher
and in consideration therefor Meagher could relieve
Stock fro1n any responsibility he had as a co-lessee.
This is just what occurred and Stock, therefore, did
receive a benefit which constitutes full legal consideration to support the transfer.
If Phebus had acceded to Meagher's request and
had exeeuted a transfer of his interest as did Stock,
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an

lessees' rights and obligations would thereby have
been extinguished. As it was, since Phebus did not
release, the lease was not extinguished but Stock's
interest had passed to Meagher and Stock's obligations
thereunder to Meagher were extinguished.
Appellants seem to argue that a landowner can never
gather up outstanding leasehold rights when there
is more than one lessee unless he obtains a release
from all of the co-tenants. This, of course, is nonsense
and particularly so in the case of oil leases which
are frequently divided into numerous undivided interests.
It is true that Meagher considered the lease to be a
nullity at the time he asked for the release. On the
other hand, the record discloses that Meagher did consider that the property still had oil prospects as shown
in his letter to Phebus of Nove1nber 9, 1944 (A-28), in
hich he frankly stated that other parties were trying
to lease the land from hi1n. Thus it appears that
~leagher fully intended to do what he could to develop
the property. Naturally if those efforts were successful, the value of the right to expore for and produce
oil would go froln
nominal to a substantial value.
But · Meagher 1nade no effort to conceal this from
Phebus or fro1n Stock and the question of adequacy
of consideration to support the release is not affected
by calculations of its value based upon developments
conducted years later.

" 7

a
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"\Vhen the release was requested 1\leagher sincerely
believed that Stock and J>hebus had no lawful rights.
Stock "·as indifferent, but he did e(nne to the reasonable
conclusion that after holding onto this property for 15
years and having been unable to do anything with it, it
'vas high tin1e that he release it baek to the landowner.
This is ju~t what Standard Oil Compan~r of California and its subsidiary did for Stock and Phebus
after they took a lease and decided not to develop it.
These con1panies were not in default when they released. .._·\Jthough the record is silent on the point, the
circumstances of the transaction are such that we
confidently assert that Stock and Phebus paid nothing
to the California Company for its release back to
the1n. If the argument claiming inadequacy of consideration has merit, the California Company could
no'v claim that its release to Stock and Phebus is
voidable. Such a contention \vould also be nonsense.
On the subject of adequacy of consideration, appellants go to the extre1ne in clutching at straws. Where
adequacy of consideration is relevant, the inquiry is
always lhnited to the fair value of the subject matter
of the transfer considered at the time it is made. Inadequacy of consideration cases are closely related to
fraud and usually involve over-reaching of an ignorant
person by one possessed of superior information. On
the subject of superior information, do appellants con-
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tend that Meagher knew when he as~ed for this release
that the property overlay an oil field~ The values
which appellants urge to establish the inadequacy are
predicated upon oil sales commencing in September
of 1948. The transaction which is attacked for inadequacy occurred in October of 1944.
Thus, regardless of whether Stock was under a
contractual duty to release or was voluntarily turning
back his lessees' rights, the fact remains that he did
make the transfer and did thereby cease to have any
obligations as a lessee. These facts alone dispose of
the issue of consideration.
Barker v. Smythe ('Vyo. 1944), 143 Pac. (2d)
565;
Exeter Co. v. Santuel Martin, Ltd. (Wash. 1940)
105 Pac. (2d) 83;
Hallam v. Commercial Mining &; Realty Co.
( C.C.A. 10, 1931), 49 Fed. ( 2d) 103, cert.
den. ; 284 U. S. 643.
It is not necessary to support Meagher's position
but an additional element of consideration can be
found in the facts. It will be noted that the quiet title
suit was comn1enced on October 17, 1944 immediately
after Katherine Meagher had written to Stock asking
for his release. Stock was named as a party in the
action but since he was a nonresident, service by publication was required to obtain jurisdiction. However,
the requested release from Stock was executed Oc-
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tober 21 . 1944. _ At no titue \\·as service on Stock perfected, and hi~ first appearance 1n the action on
August 17. 1.949 'vas purely Yoluntary. Thus ~t[eagher
forbore prosecution of his suit against Stock in consideration for the release Stock had given him. In
fact, if ~Ieagher had later sought to bring Stock into
the suit, Stock could certainly have urged his release
as a basis for obtaining a sunnnary dismissal.

' re

kno"~

of no case "1'here a lessee under an oil
and gas lea~e 'vho has released his interest to the
landowner has been able to repudiate his release on
the basis of lack or inadequacy of consideration. And
where, as here, discovery of oil intervenes between
execution of the release and the effort to rescind it,
no such case can ever arise.

6. THE STOCK TO MEAGHER TRANSFER MAY NOT BE
RESCINDED ON THE GROUND OF MISTAKE.

This section of appellants' brief goes to great lengths
to avoid the use of the term ''rescission''. This omission is not inadvertent. The obvious purpose of our
able adversaries is to divert this court's attention from
the fact that the plea of mistake, like fraud, lack of
consideration, and estoppel goes to the question of
whether Stock can rescind the instrun1ent he signed.
This, of course, inllilediately brings to mind the
1nany affir1native duties which are hnposed upon one
who seeks res~ission, practically all of which have been
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ignored by Stock. These will be discussed in Section
10, infra. We now turn to the question of whether a
1nistake was made of a character which will support
. .
resciss1on even if Stock could meet the conditions
precedent to exercising this right.
We frankly state that Meagher was under a misapprehension with respect to his legal rights at the
tin1e he asked Stock to release his interest. Meagher
thought the lease had been forfeited or at least had
been abandoned. He frankly said so. But Stock did
not share this misapprehension. Although the doctrine
of rescission for mistake has many ramifications, one
element exists in all the cases, that is : the party
aggrieved n1ust have participated in the error. That
element is lacking here and we prove it by the testimony of Stock himself. 11
Even if Stock had joined in Meagher's error, the mistake
·would not constitute grounds for rescission because of Stock's
negligence and indifference.
See Fraters G & P Co. v. Southwestern C Co. (1930), 107
Cal. App. 1, · 290 Pac. 45, which states:
·
"The purden is on one who relies upon iraud or mistalte
as grounds for the rescission or revision of an instrument
to allege and prove the essential elements of the charge.
* * * Courts of equity will not encourage the cancellation
or revision of instruments on the ground of mistake where
they appear to\ have been executed by the cmnplainant
without the exercise of reasonable care. ''
See also: Moreno jfut. lrr. Co. v. Beauntont Irr. Dist. (1949),
94 Cal. App. (2d) 766, 211 Pac. (2d) 928, which states:
"Moreover, mere ignorance of the facts is not necessarily
a ground for relief nor will the courts relieve one from the
consequences of his own improvidence or poor judgment.
Parties must exercise ordinary diligence * * * and may not
avoid a contract on the basis of mistake where it appears
that ignorance of the facts was the result of carelessness,
indifference or inattention. ''
11
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.Appellants say: '~In light of all the circun1stances
it is elearly evident that Stoek \vas 1nistaken as to
the contractual obligation to relea~e as to Meagher.''
This "·e en1phntieally dispute. The record offers circumstantial eYidenee in support of this statement except
for the fact that Stock ·s ou;n testirnony precludes it.
He was directly asked what he had in mind when he
signed the relea8e. This question gave him a fair
opportunity to support the elahn of mistake contained
in his pleading. But to the credit of our adversaries,
\Ve can :5ay that Stock \Vas not coached. He made no
effort \vha tsoever to clain1 that he signed the release
because he thought he was legally obliged to or because
he had placed any reliance in ~1eagher's contention
that he, Stock, had no remaining rights. On the contrary, he adn1itted that he only glanced at the docun1ent. He made no claim that he was misled by the
contrary to fact (or law) recitals contained therein. He
admitted that he only glanced at Katherine Meagher's
letter. He 1nade no clain1 that he was n1istaken with
respect to his legal rights. In fact, he admitted that
he had not even read the pleading which had been filed
in his behalf.
The only explanation Stock made upon which anyone could predicate an attack upon the release was
· · that he thought he was transferring back to Meagher
certain royaltie~. But there is a limit to what mistakes 'vill support a rescission. One cannot make a mistake so flagrant, so irresponsible as the only one Stock
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suggested in his testimony and still avoid responsibility therefor. There was nothing in any correspondenee from Meagher to indicate that he was limiting
hi R request to a transfer of royalties. The subject of
royalties was injected into the correspondence by
Stock's rnan IIinkley nine months prior to the letter
K.a therine Meagher sent to Stock. Her letter enclosed
the release and is the letter Stock acted upon. Her
letter said nothing about royalties and expressed the
request for a release in such clear and direct language
that no one could have misunderstood her intent. The
only explanation Stock assigned as his reason for
avoiding the release was not acceptable to the trial
court. The trial judge saw and heard the witness.
Stock offered no other explanation. Even if Stock's
testimony had been acceptable to the court, the best
situation appellants could present would involve mistakes of both parties relating to different matters. This
situation will not support rescission. The rule is stated
in Restatement, Contracts, Section 503, as follows:
''A mistake of only one party that forms the basis
on which he enters into a transaction does not of
itself render the transaction voidable; nor do nlistakes of both parties if the respective mistakes
relate to different matters * * *"
Nor can appellants suggest that Stock was ignorant
of the ways of handling oil interests. The trial judge
refers to Stock as a man of ''wide experience and
manifest sagacity.'' In this regard note that Stock
had been in the oil business for many years and by
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the end of 19+-t. had dealt extensively \vith oil leases
and royalties and oil intere~ts of all kinds. In fact
during 1934 he sold a substantial part of his oil interests to The Texas Con1pany in n deal involving·
millions. This is not the type of individual who is
likely to 111ake a 1uis take in the release of an oil interest. . .\nd if he had n1ade the n1istake suggested by
his counsel he \Yould not forget it when asked the
outright question as to \\.,.hat \Vas in his 1nind when
he signed the release.
V\r e have ~tated to the trial court and we say again
here that our comn1ents with respect to Stock's frame
of Inind and his failure to read his own pleadings.
are not to be understood as insinuating improper conduct on the part of opposing counsel. The documents
of record do present eircun1stantial evidence indicating
the possibility of estoppel or mistake. But the actual
testi1nony of Stock with respect to his own state of
mind first at the time he executed the release and second

at the time he bought into the deal in 1948, refutes
the circumstantial inferences beyond a doubt.
The true facts with respect to the issue of mistake are these: 1leagher made a mistake and thought
his legal position was stronger than it actually was.
He cannot be blamed for this misapprehension for
his position was confirn1ed by a· trial court and it was
not until that decision had been reversed by this
court that ~feagher knew he was wrong. Meagher
may have presented his misapprehension to Stock in
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~uch a manner that Stock could have joined in
Meagher's mistake of law. Conceivably Stock might
have relied upon Meagher's erroneous presentation of
the situation in such a manner as to permit him to
rescind his own instrument. But the facts, disclosed
from the mouth of Stock hirnself, establish that no
such error motivated any of Stock's actions.

On the face of it, it would appear that Stock was
grossly negligent. However, we suggest that this is
not the true explanation. The real reason why Stock released to ~Ieagher is because he was finished with the
Ashley Valley Oil structure. He had been interested
for 15 years. The best he was able to do was to get
Standard to take over the lease. Standard held it
for 3 years and turned it back. Stock figured it was
''a dead play'' to use the language of oil men like
appellants. When the letter from Katherine Meagher
came in the fall of 1944 Stock knew it was a request
from a patient landowner to release the property in
order to give him a chance to do something with ·it
himself. That is what Stock did. Actually Stock wasn't
interested in the legal status of the lease. He was
through with it.
There is no factual or legal basis for rescission here
predicated upon mistake of law or fact or otherwise.
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7.

THE STOCK TO MEAGHER TRANSFER, VIEWED AS A
SURRENDER, IS A VALID RELINQUISHMENT OF STOCK'S
INTEREST IN THE LEASE TO MEAGHER.

.A.ppellants object to the use of the \vord ''transfer''
which is en1ployed in the findings to describe the legal
effect of }:xhibit ~\-30.
The trial court'~ first opinion reached conclusions
which \Vould logically and properly follow fro1n an
interpretation of the docu1nent as a ''surrender''.
However, those conelusions were inconsistent with the
stipulation made in court by Meagher 'vhich foreclosed
any contention that ~{eagher was making an effort to
attack the overriding royalty 'vhich defendant Ashley
alley Oil Con1pany had acquired. The trial court's
analysis yielded a smaller interest for all appellants
than 'vas conceded by the stipulation. However, Meagher was bound by his stipulation and promptly
pointed out the situation to the trial court. The findings cleared up the n1a tter and the trial court filed
a supplemental opinion explaining that regardless of
\vhether the transfer be vie\ved as a ''surrender'' or
as a "conveyance" it was a transfer sufficient to pass
fron1 Stock to ~Ieagher 'vhatever lessee's rights Stock
had in the leasehold.

,r

The findings of fact were adopted by the court
only after objections were filed and argument thereon.
Of course, the findings are not to be modified or sup-
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planted by remarks of the court in discussing the
decision.
Pender v. Anderson (September 11, 1951, 235
Pac. (2d) 360;
Christen~~en v. Nielsen, 73 Utah 603, 276 Pac.

645.
But the above rule need not be invoked by Meagher
because the trial court's supplen1ental opinion corrected the oversight, so there is no inconsistency to
explain.
:hioreover, the result finally reached in the findings,
conclusions and decree varied from the original opinion
only by increasing the amount of overriding royalty
adjudicated to Stock and Juhan as well as to . .t\.shley
Valley Oil Company. The decree awards 4% to Ashley
in lieu of 2%; 1% to Juhan in lieu of ¥2'%; and Stock
received 1% in lieu of~%. Thus appellants here seek
to make capital of the fact that the findings and decree
give them more than the original opinion, and this
even though it was Meagher who voluntarily brought
the prior stipulation to the attention of the trial
court.
Actually, the Stock to Meagher transfer is really
a quitclaim 12 and as such is both a "surrender" and a
''conveyance''.
12Jn Section 8 we discuss the granting clause of the document
and demonstrate that it is a valid quitclaim deed.
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Since Rertion 7 of appellants' brief elects to attack
the transfer H8 a ~urrender~ 've 'vill no'v seek to tneet
those argutnents.
(a.) The transfer is not affected by the provisions of Exhibit

A-5, the modification of the lease.

First. appellants argue that the surrender was not
1nade in the utanner prescribed by the tnodification
agree1uent~ ..~:\-5, 'vhich changed many of the terms
of the original lease, . A. -1. We answer: First, this
is not an accurate interpretation of the 1nodification
agreen1ent; second, a surrender consented to by both
lessor and lessee supersedes any provisions in the
lease concerning surrender.
Defendants argue that paragraphs 20 and 28 of the
modification agreement set forth the method and prescribe the conditions under which a surrender n1ay
be given, and urge that the Stock-to-Meagher surrender (.A.-30) is ineffective in that it was executed
in a different n1anner than contemplated in the cited
paragraphs of the 1nodification agreement.
1ieagher replies that the provisions of the modification agreement concerning surrender refer to the
lessees' right to surrender, regardless of the desires
of the lessor. Surrender is not always desirable fron1
the lessor's point of view, and for this reason condition~ were properly included In the agreement to
specify the tern1s under which the lessee can force a
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surrender upon the lessor. This has no bearing upon
the right of the lessor and lessee to negotiate a surrender by 1nutual consent, which is always inherent in
any leasehold.
Meagher concedes that the provisions of the modification agree1nent are such that Ashley's rights to
an overriding royalty 1nust be protected. But there
has. been no atternpt in this litigation to curtail Ashley's rights to this royalty, and what Stock could
surrender he did surrender, narn.ely, his one-half interest in the lease.
Everything in paragraphs 20 and 28 of the modification agreement is designed to define the conditions
upon which the lessee may, as a matter of right, ''be
relieved and released of all obligations'' under the
lease. There is nothing in the provisions of the
agreen1ent which precludes the lessor and one or more
lessees from agreeing to a surrender on other or different terms than those specified in the agreement
so long as the . rights of third parties are not
prejudiced.
Furthermore, the possibility that a surrender might
be effected. in some manner other than those specified
in paragraph 20 is recognized in paragraph 26 of the
1nodification agreement, which provides (emphasis
ours):

''Notwithstanding . anything in this lease provided or contained to the contrary, it is hereby
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expressly agreed by the lessee tha. t ·in the event of,
and at all thnes frotn and after, the forfeiture,
cancellation. .-:nr·render and/or other termination
for any ca.use u~hatsoerer, of the lessee's right
to drill, prospect and1O't prod~uce oil upon the
lands the subject of this agreen1en t, then the lessors, their respective heirs, legal representatives,
andjor assigns shall have, and the lessee hereby
grants unto the1n, reciprocal rights of possession
and control of, and all necessary rights-of-way
• * * for the purpose of prospecting, drilling
for, * * * all oil contained in or produced from;
• * * it being the understanding and intent of
the parties hereto that in the event of the surrender or other terminating of lessee's said such
oil rights, the lessee shall thereafter exercise his
rights to operate and develop for gas upon the
lands the subject of this agreement in a manner
consistent with the reciprocal rights of the lessors
to operate said lands for oils. * * *"
The foregoing paragraph is important not only as
a recognition that there might be a surrender in a
manner different from that contemplated elsewhere in
the modification agreement, but it also demonstrates
the proposition that Stock's surrender to Meagher is
adequate to pass Stock's right to prospect for oil,
even though Stock was divested of the right to develop for gas.
Anticipating the above arguments, appellants then
say that where lessor and lessee consent to a sur-
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render in a manner different from that provided in
the lease, ''the consent of the lessor must be shown.''
We submit that acceptance of the transfer, recording
it and relying upon it in subsequent litigation, eVIdences Meagher's consent beyond question.
(b) The transfer does not lack consideration.

Next appellants say that the transfer- wants consideration when viewed as a surrender. The question
of consideration has been fully discussed in Section 5,
s~tpra, and the argument therein is fully applicable
here.
(c) Stock was fully empowered to surrender to the reversioner Meagher whatever interest he had in the leasehold.

Appellants' next point is the assertion that Stock
did not have the power to surrender his interest in
the lease. Meagher concedes that Stock and Stock
and Meagher together could not contract in such a
manner as to cut off the rights of any other party
having an interest in the lessee's rights under the
lease. But no such effect resulted under this transfer.
Appellants' entire argun1ent at this point is predicated
upon hypothetical damage to Ashley Valley Oil Company but not to appellants Stock, Juhan, or Phebus.
Ashley Valley Oil Con1pany has filed its own appeal
in this case. It charges no error with respect to any
rights it might have in the 440-acre parcel. That parcel
is the only property involved in the dispute between
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1[eagher and appellant~ tluhan, Stock and Phebus. Yet
it is the hypothetical rights of Ashley Valley Oil
Co1npa11y, not their o'vn, 'vhich these appellants now
urge. The explanation of this situation lies in the
fact that :J[eag-her 8tipulated in open court that he
did not attack the overriding royalty interests of
.A.shley \""alley Oil Co1npany. Thus any contractual
provision8 designed to protect those interests were
not affected by the transfer from Stock. This stipulation was fully kept. The decree awards Ashley everything Ashley rlain1ed so far as concerns the 440-acre
parcel. Obviously, a lessee can surrender what he has
to his lessor so long as no injury is thereby sustained
by other parties in interest. Meagher claims no different result fron1 this. Ashley Valley Oil Company
makes no complaint. The other appellants are not concerned.
(d) Meagher was the owner of the reversionary rights in the
property and as such was eligible to receive a surrender.

Finally in attacking the effect of the transfer, viewed
as a surrender, appellants claim that Meagher was
not the reversioner. In fact, appellants claim the reversionary rights themselves by virtue of a deed to
J1Jd\vard F. Richards, one of the attorneys for appellants, which was obtained Septe1nber 14, 1948 (A-61),
fro1n one Johnson who, acting for appellants, obtained
a deed from the heirs of M. P. Smith on September
11, 194R (A-60). Appellants concede that if Edward
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F. Richards obtained any interest by virtue of these
deeds he holds for the benefit of appellants. It is
noteworthy that appellants did not consider these
belated transactions worthy of inclusion in their own
chart of the title (A-62), 'vhich is reproduced in their
brief. 13 Meagher also considers these transactions to
be irrelevant and omitted them from his chart (A-57).
But to return to the question of Meagher's reversionary rights: It was agreed at pre-trial that the
question of reversion depends upon construction of
the deeds 1\II. P. Smith gave to Meagher as to an
undivided four-fifths interest (A-7) and to Meagher's
grantor, Alexander, as to the remaining undivided
one-fifth (A-8). The question is whether these deeds
passed only surface rights to the grantees or also
passed the reversionary oil and gas rights which Smith
held as lessor.
{

By ''reversionary rights'' in this case we mean the
rights remaining in the owner of the fee after he has
leased his property for oil and gas development. Such
reversionary rights could be termed "lessor's rights".
Possibly a helpful way to analyze the location of
the reversionary or lessor's rights in the oil and gas
estate is to follow each transaction and see where the
reversion vested thereafter.
13These two deeds were procured by appellants' attorney within
less than a week prior to discovery of oil. The record is silent as
to the consideration paid to the widow and children of M. P.
Smith.
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\Ye ~tart 'vith Sheridan, the fee o'vner prior to
execution of any lease, at 'vhich thne Sheridan, of
course, owned the entire oil and gas estate.
Then Sheridan exeeuted the original lease to R. C.
Hill C:\.-1). It 'v'ill be undisputed that Sheridan was
the lessor, and, as ~uch, retained the reversionary
or lessor's rights.
Then Sheridan eonveyed his entire interest to Smith
{A-4). It i~ undisputed that Smith thereby acquired
the oil and g-a~ estate ~ubject to the leasehold, and, as
such, became the reversioner.
Then S1nith executed a number of assignments of
royalty (the one to Meagher is Ex. A-46, and all of
these assignments are enumerated in A-7). These assignments of royalty did not pass any reversionary
or lessor's rights to the various assignees. They
merely assigned the value of certain specified proportions of ultimate production from the property.
Then Smith entered into the· modification agreement
with Ashley Valley Oil Co. (A-5). This, however, is
nothing more than what it purports to be, namely, a
modification of the terms of the original lease. While
it is true that this modification agreement converted
an ordinary lease into one much more onerous on the
lessor, it would be the height of presumption to contend that Smith thereby lost the remainder of his oil
and gas estate. The 1nodification agreement contains no
provisions indicating an intent to eliminate Smith
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from the chain of title to the oil and gas estate and, on
the contrary, provides: (1) that Smith succeeded to
the rights of the Sheridans, the lessors, (2) that certain
paragraphs of the lease are superceded by specific substitute paragraphs, (3) that the parties be designated
as "lessor" and "lessee", ( 4) that the lease be forfeited to .Smith if specified events of default should
occur, and (5) that Smith is the proper party to who1n
surrender shall be made if and when surrender if;
made.
Bearing In mind that all owners of royalties subscribed to the modification agreement, the express recognition of Smith as the lessor or reversioner would
seem conclusive on three points: (1) there were reversionary rights in existence after execution of the
modification agreement, (2) Smith was the reversioner,
and (3) the royalty owners had no reversionary rights.
Si~ce

Smith obtained these reversionary or lessor's
rights from Sheridan and did not transfer then1 to
anyone else until he conveyed to Meagher, the entire
issue with respect to the location of reversionary rights
depends upon construction of the transfers fron1 Smith
to Meagher as to an undivided four-fifths (A-7), and
from Smith to Alexander as to an undivided one-fifth
(A-8). Since these documents are substantially identiral,
an analysis of A-7 ~hould be sufficient.
This deed says that Smith, for a valuable consideration, quitclaims an undivided four-fifths interest in
the land to Meagher, excepting and reserVIng all the
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rights in the land and in the oil and gas which have
been sold or disposed of by the S1niths or their grantors
under the following instrun1ents to which this grant is
subject:
(a) The Sheridan lease;
(b) to (h), inclusive.

Various assignments of land-

owner's royalty;
(i)" The modific.ation agreement of May 21, 1926
(A-5).

The deed further states that Meagher assumes and
agrees to pay and to perform the obligations of Smith
under the above instruments and agrees to hold Smith
harn1less and to indemnify him for any loss occasioned
by any default in the performance of said obligations.
The deed can be analyzed down to this: Smith transfers to Meagher the 480 acres subject to the lease,
the modification agreement, and the royalty assignments, and l\f.eagher assumes and agrees to perform
Smith's obligations with respect to those interests.
As pointed out above, none of these ·assignments or
agreements disposed of Smith's reversionary rights or
his lessor's rights, and therefore 'vhen Smith conveyed everything he had to Meager subject to those
outstanding instruments, Meagher succeeded to Sn1ith's
reversionary or lessor's rights.
It is understandable why Smith spelled out the obligation of his grantees, Meagher and Alexander, in such
detail. It. was prudent for him to make sure that his
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grantee should acquire and assume the charges he had
imposed upon his oil and gas estate. As to the lease,
he had slight cause to be troubled, because it was obviously an interest in land eligible for recordation, but,
as to the outstanding royalties, even though the assignments expressly state that they shall constitute covenants running with the land, they were also. personal
obligations of Smith. If the lessee paid the royalties
due under the lease to Smith's grantee, and for any
reason the royalty owners were not paid, Srr1ith would
be personally responsible. Even though such landowner's royalties are universally recognized in oil states
as interests in land eligible for recordation, there 'vas
no Utah law on the subject, and in some states in the
early stages of their oil industry, considerable confusion
has been experienced as to the nature of royalty interests. Under the circumstances, it was proper for Smith
to take care, in wording his deeds, to bring forcibly to
the attention of his grantee the responsibility for recognizing the charges existing against Smith's oil and gas
estate, and to require them to warrant that they would
see to it that the lessor's obligations under the lease
would be performed and that the royalty owners would
be protected. But it does not follow from this that
Smith retained his oil and gas estate or his reversionary or lessor's rights therein. On the contrary, if suc.h
had been his intent, his grantees would have had no
standing with the lessee and would have no opportunity
to do any of the things against which Smith sought protection. If Meagher was not to be the lessor of the
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lease after acqtnring the property from Sn1ith, there
was no occasion to require hhn to pay over the royalties to Sn1ith ~s assignees. In other words, if Meagher
was not to be the lessor~ there 'vas no occasion for
Smith to insist that 1[eagher perforn1 the lessor's obligations. It follo,vs, of course, that if Meagher "·as to
become the lessor~ he would succeed to the reversionary
rights remaining to Smith as lessor.
To sununarize the above: Smith conveyed the property to 1Ieagher subject to whatever interests Smith
had previously conveyed away. He reserved nothing
else. Since Smith had not previously conveyed away
his reversionary rights Meagher becan1e the reversioner.14
Meagher submits that the foregoing demonstrates
that the transfer, viewed as a surrender, is a valid relinquishment to lVIeagher of whatever · lessee's rights
Stock had in the lease.

8.

THE STOCK T'O MEA,GHER TRANSFER, VIEWED AS A
CONVEYANCE, IS EFFECTIVE TO TRANSFER STOCK'S
INTEREST IN THE LEASE TO MEAGHER.

When a landowner seeks to clear his title of outstanding easements, leases or other encumbrances, the
accepted procedure is to obtain quitclaims from the
See pages 14-18 of the trial court's opinion for a discussion
of the reversionary rights fully supporting Meagher's contentions. FindingH 22 a11d 23 and Conclusion 11 dispose of the
Issue.
14
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parties who hold such outstanding interests. Those interests may be valid or invalid but once the holders
thereof quitclaim them, the landowner's title is cleared.
Particularly is this procedure adapted to eliminate
outstanding interests in oil and gas leases. Sometin1es
the lease interests are in default, sometimes not. But
once the holder transfers his interest by quitclain1 he
has conveyed to the landowner the interest he held regardless of whether he was legally obliged to do so.
Surely this court will take judicial notice of the 'veilknown fact that oil lands are frequently leased, quitclaimed, and leased again. We venture the staten1ent
(though unsupported by the record) that every major
oil company has at one time or another quitclaimed
lands subsequently proved to overlay an oil field.
Thus appellants' repetition here of the conceded fact
that Stock was not obliged to quitclaim is nothing
but a reargument of the claim of rescission which has
been thoroughly covered elsewhere. Of course, it 'vas
Meagher's purpose to clear up his title. He said so
very clearly. In fact, the immediate reason which
1notivated Meagher was to be in a position to lease the
property to someone else for further exploration.
Meagher's letters frankly explain this.
We cannot understand the following statement contained in appellants' brief: ''Meagher was not asking
for a transfer of interest nor did he believe the Stock
instrument "" • * to be a transfer or a surrender.~' What
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else could l\{eagher possibly have thought it was 1 H0
had asked in unequiyoeal "·ords for a quitclaim. Stock
complied. }leagher \Vas asking the same thing of
Phebus. Phebus declined. Neither quitclaim was dependent or conditioned upon receipt of the other.
~Ieagher \vas frankly and openly gathering up all potential lease interests in order to be free to make a
new lease. If Stock's transfer was not a conveyance of
his interest, what 'vas it!
Appellants con1plain that ''This court is now called
upon to determine the effect of the instrument by the
sheer weight of its words.'' We plead guilty to this
charge. How else are documents construed 1 Meagher
does not deny that the words contained in the recitals in
the quitclaim which Stock gave him require explanation because they recite conclusions of law which were
subsequently held by this court to be erroneous. IIowever, as demonstrated above, Stock was not misled by
these words for he paid no attention to them.
This brings us to the words contained in the granting clause of the instrun1ent and to the real subject of
this section of appellants' argument. We find-the following:
"Now, therefore, know .all men by these presents:
That Paul Stock does hereby cancel, release, relinquish and surrender to N. J. Meagher, his heirs and
assigns, all of his right, title and interest in and
to the said oil and gas lease and all of his right,
title and interest in and to the said oil and ~aR
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lease in so far as it conveys the lands above described.''

These are the ·words of a quitclaim deed. The essence
of a quitclaim lies in the fact that it only conveys ''the
right, title and interest" of the grantor. The purpose
of this phrase is to avoid any implied warranty of title.
It only passes what the grantor had. It promises nothing. It is a convenient form of conveyance where a
grantor doubts whether he has an interest. It was properly used for that purpose when Stock conveyed nothing
to Chas. S. Hill in the Stock-Hill-Juhan deal. But if
the grantor does have an interest, that interest is conveyed. Yes, it is the "sheer weight" of these "words"
which conveyed to Meagher whatever interests in the
lease Stock then owned.
This court will search 1n va1n through appellants'
brief to find any authority denying vitality to words of
conveyance similar to the combination of verbs used in
this document. True, the same result could have been
more simply obtained by using the simpler verb ''quit-_
claim" or "grant" or "convey" or any number of
similar expressions. But the meaning of these words
cannot be misunderstood. Their meaning was to take
from Stock and give to Meagher •~all of his right, title
and interest in and to the said oil and gas lease". It
cannot be attacked by clain1ing inadequate words of conveyance. Here again, as it has so often occurred during
this litigation, when the facts are put. forward as they
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exist rather than as the~~ n1 i,qht have been, the issue is
solved by application of the n1ost elementary legal
principles.
There are n1any cases holding these words adequate
for purpo~es of qnitclain1. Osburn D. Finkelstein, 189
Ind. 90: 126 N.E. 11, is particularly interesting because the \vords of grant there \Vere ''surrenders, cancels, annuls, and releases''. The only difference is that
our docun1ent says ''relinquish" where the cited case
employs the verb" annuls". In the Osbo1·n case the document of transfer \Vas held to be an effective quitclaim.
The court said :
''Appellant does not say what word or words should
here be added to make this release sufficient. We
are left to imagine that he means 'quitclaim'. We
hold it sufficient without that word."
In Ruthrauff v. Silver King Co., 95 Utah 279, 80 Pac.
(2d) 338, it was held that the statutory form of quitclaim deed is permissive only and use of the words •' remise, release and quitclaim'' were sufficient to transfer
all of grantor's interest.
In the early and leading case of Field v. Colom,bet,
9 Fed. Cas. 12, Case No. 4764, the federal court sitting
In California said:
''Any words in a ·deed indicating an intention to
transfer the estate, interest or claim of the grantor
\vill be a sufficient conveyance, whethey they be such
as were generally used in a deed of feoffment,
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or of bargain or sale, or of release, _irrespective of
the fact of possession of grantor or grantee, or of
the statute of uses.''
In Evenson v. Webster (So. Dak.), 53 N.W. 747, the
court held that the simple word "give" was sufficient
to · convey real property, citing Field v. Colombet,
supra.
In Olson v. Cornwell, 134 Cal. App. 419, the court approved the following careless granting clause: ''shall
have and from now on are entitled to'', saying:
''It seems clear from the language of the parties
that it was the intention to make a present transfer
to plaintiffs of an undivided interest in the property; and where the intent is expressed it is sufficient, whatever may be the inaccuracy of expression, or the inaptness of the words used, and the
courts will give the instruments that effect.''
In .Adams v. Reed, 11 Utah 480, 40 Pac. 720, affirmed
168 U.S. 573, a deed of "release" was recognized and
treated as a quitclaim deed.

9.

MEAGHER'S LANDOWNER'S ROYALTY INTERES·T OAN
BE ADJUDICATED IN THIS ACTION.

We now come to an entirely distinct phase of the
case. The argument thus far has been concerned with
the determination of the o'vnership of outstanding les-
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see ·s right~ in the lease. The subject of this section is
the o'vnership of an undivided one-third of two per
cent in lando,vners' royalties "~hich 'vere originally created by )[ .P. Sn1ith "~hen he owned the property. We
are satisfied that all parties agree that these landowners' royalty interests are not in any sense of the
·word interests in the leasehold but represent a different and distinct interest in the lands which are the
subject of this litigation.
The question is \Vhether Meagher owns landowner's
royalties totaling 2% in oil and gas, or, as defendants
claim, 11h?'c in oil and 2% in gas.
There is no dispute that of the landowner's royalties
totaling 12%% created by Smith, 2% was ultimately
transferred to Meagher. Sn1ith transferred ~ 1% interest to ~Ieagher directly (A-46) and Meagher obtained
the other 1% interest from Alexander (A-55), who in
turn had acquired it from Smith.
That Meagher is entitled to 2% royalties with respect to gas is not disputed. As to oil, however, his
royalty interest was reduced to 11/s% by an assignment
fro1n him and the other royalty owners to Stock and
Phebus on October 11, 1930 ( A-40). As this time, Stock
and Phebus anticipated an assignment of the lease to.
Standard Oil Company, but in order to reduce the
burden of outstanding royalties, Standard Oil Company
insisted upon the 18lh % outstanding royalties ('vhich
consisted of landowner's royalties totaling 12%% and
1
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Ashley Valley Oil Company's overriding royalties of
6:%) being reduced. Accordingly, the royalty owners
who signed document A-40 were reducing by one-third
their royalty interests on the terms set forth in A-40.
The· intent of the instrument is clear. It may be paraphrased as follows: It relates to oil royalties only;
its purpose is to obtain the drilling of a well by Standard Oil Company of California or one of its subsidiaries; if Stock and Phebus succeed, within the limitations provided in the agreement, in obtaining a test
well on the structure, the royalties assigned in A-40
are extinguished. The limitations in question are
that Standard Oil Company, or its subsidiary, shall
commence a well on the Ashley Valley structure within
certain specified time limits, but if such well is not
drilled as contemplated, then Stock and Phebus agree
to turn back the royalty interests transferred to them
in A-40.
The lease was assigned to Standard Oil Company of
California by Stock and Phebus (A-12). About a
year later Standard assigned it to its subsidiary, The
California Company (A-13). Thereafter neither Standard Oil Company of California nor The California
Company, or any other subsidiary of Standard, ever
drilled or even commenced a well on the Ashley Valley
structure. Thus Stock and Phebus were obliged to
return to Meagher the two-thirds of 1% oil royalty
he had ·contributed to facilitate the deal with Standard
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on the tern1s set forth in A-40. Rtock and Phebus
thereupon becan1e the trustees of Meagher as to this
royalty interest and ~Ieagher again became the beneficial o'vner thereof. It is this equitable title to this
two-thirds of 1% oil royalty that Meagher seeks to
quiet.

A quiet title action is appropriate to establish the
existence of this equitable title in Meagher. The rule
is now well established that one n1ay prove whatever
title one o'vns, legal or equitable, under general allegations of o'vnership in a quiet title action.
State r. Rolio, 71 Utah 91, 292 P. 987;
Olive·r v. Dougherty (Ariz.), 68 P. 553;
Van l'"ranken v. Granite County (Mont.), 90 P.
164.
The royalty interest involved is an interest in real
estate, and, as such, is provable under a general allegation of ownership of the land. In Kansas, the rule
seems to be otherwise, but all other authorities we
have found hold that royalties created by the landowner are interests in land.
Watkins v. Slaughter (Tex.), 189 S.W. (2d) 699;
La Laguna Ranch v. Dodge 18 Cal. (2d) 132,
114 P. (2d) 351;
Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Dixon (Wyo.),
122 P. (2d) 842;
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Williams' Administrator v. Union Bank db Trust
Co. (Ky.), 143 S.W. (2d) 297;
Veal v. Thom,ason (Tex.), 159 S.W. (2d) 472.
Therefore, Meagher is entitled to a decree declaring
that he is the owner of the equitable title to the twothirds of 1 landowner's royalty free from any claims
of the defendants herein in addition to the 1%% royalty which is concededly owned by Meagher.

ro

It is true that the legal title to the disputed twothirds of one per cent was transferred to Stock and
Phebus. Defendants say that if this interest is beneficially owned by Meagher, his remedy is to sue in
equity to enforce specific performance of a reconveyance. If such remedy does exist, it does not preclude
declaration by this court of Meagher's equitable title,
which is all that Meagher seeks at this time. As demonstrated above, the existence of an equitable title is
one which can be ascertained in a quiet title action.
The record discloses that there have been many assignments of interests owned and claimed to be owned
by Stock and Phebus since they acquired Meagher's
royalty. ~-,rankly, plaintiff is not sure whether these
defendants have retained the legal title to this royalty,
and, if they have parted with it, specific perforn1ance
would be an empty remedy. All that Meagher requests
in this action with respect to his royalty is a declaration that he is beneficially entitled to it. Thereafter,
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hePn 'vrongfully transferred~
whether or not to a bona fide purchaser for value with ..
out notice, he 'vill at least havP laid the foundation of
ownership to 'vhich he is entitled nnd can then pursue
such ren1edy as tnay be neePssary. When Stock and

if it deYelops that it

ha~

Phebus failed to reconvey as they agreed to, they becaine constructive or resulting trustees for Meagher's
benefit of this royalty interest.

~leagher

should not be

forced to sue all of the others 'vho have becon1e involved in this eo1nplica ted chain of title if his trustees
have violated their trust. The obvious multiplicity of
actions 'vhich would ensue points up the very reason
why the courts have and do take cognizance of equitable interests in quiet title proceedings.
The appellants seen1 to indulge in asserting interests
to which they are not entitled and then claiming laches
when they are asked to disgorge. Such tactics are not
favored by courts who are called upon to declare equitable titles held by resulting or constructive trustees.
A landowner's royalty is real estate. If one should
transfer his horne for a limited purpose one does not
risk loss of o'vnership by leaving the title with one's
trustee after the limited purpose is accomplished.
'rhe final paragraph of Section 9 of appellants' brief
co1npletely confuses interests in the lease with landowner's royalties. 'l,his paragraph criticizes the trial
court for failing to hold that Stock's transfer to

Meagher affected outstanding lando"rner 's royalties.,
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But that transfer pertains only to lessee's rights under
the lease. It has no bearing upon landowner's royalties
as distinguished from overriding royalties. J_Jandowner 's royalti~s do not depend upon the existence of an
oil lease for their validity. They are interests in the
oil and gas estate created by the landowner. On
the other hand, overriding royalties do depend upon
the existence of the lease from which they are carved
out. They are interests in the production and are created by the lessee. If a lease is extinguished, the overriding royalties fall with it, and this is what the trial
court spelled out in the ~riginal opinion. However, in
recognition of the protection against this very thing
which was saved to R. C. Hill 15 when he assigned
the lessee's rights to Utah Oil Refining Co. (A-2),
Meagher stipulated and conceded that the transfer
from Stock could not cut off the overriding royalty.
The fact that the briefs below did not call the trial
court's attention to this portion of the record was cured
by the findings and the decree after Meagher pointed
out the inadvertence.
But landowner's royalties are interests which are
carved out of the fee estate, not from a particular
lease. They are not dependent upon the existence of
a lease for their validity and existence. Thus when
15Ashley Valley Oil Company obtained its rights from R. C.
Hill by assignment of November 10, 1924 (A-3). Please refer to
chart attached.
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Stock transferred to
and

interP~ t

~leaghPr

·'all of his right, title

in and to said oil and gas

lea~'-;e ''

he did

not convey any royalty interest to Meagher and the
point 'vhich appellant refer~ to as "interesting to
observe'' beco1ues 1nea.ningless and leads only to confusion.
The issue cone.erning

~{eagher 's

outstanding land-

owner'~

royalty is discussed in the trial court's opinion
at pages 39-44.

10. STOCK IS BARRED BY LACHES FROM ASSERTING
RESCISSION OF HIS TRANSFER TO MEA;GHER.

In order to discuss each point suggested by appel-

lants in the order presented by the1n, the above contention which is asserted in Meagher's behalf appears
here somewhat out of context.
It will be noted that the defenses of lack of consideration, fraud, estoppel, and mistake are all directed
to the basic issue of rescission.
We sincerely sought to meet each of these contentions in the order presented to demonstrate that there
is no merit to any of ·them. We believe we have demonstrated that Stock never could have avoided his own
transfer under the facts of the case.
But if for any conceivable reason the right to rescind
ever arose in Stock's favor his action to assert it comes
too late.
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. He executed the transfer in O·ctober of 1944. A suit
was then pending hostile to his interest in the lease
and he was named as a defendant although service had
not been effected upon him. Jurisdiction over Stock
was never perfected by Meagher. Thus Meagher aban.
doned his efforts to bring Stock into the litigation after
receipt of the transfer. By April of 1945 Stock had
discussed his transfer to :hieagher with Juhan's repre.
sentative, Chas. Hill. It 'vas then decided to contest
the legal effect of the transfer. Stock then quitclaimed
what was no more than his right to litigate with
Meagher under an agreen1ent that would yield Stock
one-eighth of what might be gleaned from that litigation. In June of 1945 ~Ieagher, who had learned of
Stock's quitclaim to Hill but did not kno'v the purpose,
wrote to Stock. He pointed out that Stock had already
transferred his lease interest to Meagher. He pointed
out that the quitclaim to Hill would confuse Meagher's
title. He pointed out that the quitclaim would complicate the problem of straightening out the landowner's
royalty situation. He asked Stock for an explanation.
Stock re1nained silent and continued to secrete his intentions until August of 1949, when he voluntarily appeared in the action. Meanwhile Meagher continued
with his quiet title action. This court determined that
the lease was still valid. The case was remanded for
further proceedings. Stock and his associates then
becarne bolder for they no·w ~;new that they had a clea.r
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right to a one-half i,ntercsf i,n the lea..~e and could get
it all if they eould shoulder ~feagher aside. They also
knew their expenses 'vould he recouped if they struck
oil. The~· decided to drill. Stock bought a new interest in
1948 just before the drilling connnenced. According to
Stock's 0\\11 e.ontentions, this purehase gave hi1n a participation independent of ~[eagher 's ulthnate interest.
Oil was discovered. Meagher continued to press his suit.
Appellants then realized that l\Ieagher could establish
his ownership of the for1ner Stock one-half interest
unless the transfer could be rescinded. Juhan's attorneys then filed an answer and counterclaim in Stock's
name setting forth for the first time all possible ·claims
for rescission. Stock did not even know what ·those
claims "'.,.ere or on what theory it was hoped the rescission could be established. He did not read the pleading.
He was called to the stand by Meagher's counsel, not his
own. Then his own testimony demonstrated beyond
question that none of the many theories, upon which
he might have had a rescission, were actually founded
upon fact.
Unless Stock by action first taken in 1949 can rescind
a transfer made in 1944 he cannot prevail here. Add
to this the fact that quiet title litigation had been going
on throughout the entire period. Add to this the fact
that oil \Vas discovered in 1948. Add to this an intention
on the part of Stock· and Juhan to disavow the transfer, which plan had been made in 1945. Add to this
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the refusal by Stock to state his position when asked
by letter to do so in 1945. If ever a claimant was
barred by laches Stock is that person.
At this point we cite for Meagher's benefit every
case on the subject of laches which has been put forward in this appeal by appellants. In addition, we
mention Frailey v. McGarry (Utah 1949), 211 Pac. (2d)
840. In that case the purchaser of land sought to
rescind for fraud. This court said:
''After reviewing the record of events as they
transpired, we find it unnecessary to determine
whether defendant, by fraud, induced the plaintiff
to enter into the contract. There are facts present
in the instant case which preclude plaintiff from
rescinding the contract for the reasons he alleges.
It is well settled by decisions from this court that
a person claiming the right to rescind a contract
because of misrepresentations or fraud, must, after
discovery of the fraud, announce his purpose and
adhere to it. .Taylor v. Moore, 87 Utah 493; 51 Pac.
2d 222. We have also held that the purchaser 1nust
evidence his intent to rescind by some unequivocal
act, either by notice or some act amounting to
notice of intent to rescind. McKellar Real Estate
Co. v. Paxton, 62 Utah 97; 218 Pac. 128."
In the Frailey case, the plaintiff was barred because
he waited only ten n1onths before notifying the plaintiff of his intention to rescind. In the case at bar, the
interval was nearly five years.
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Del..~an1ar

J/-i.nes of

1llackay (C.C.A.
9th), 104 Fed. (2d) ~71.- in \Yhich larhe~ 'vas applied
where the period before notiee of rescission 'vas given
was 19 1nonths.
See

J/onfana v.

In 30 C.J.S., p. 540, the rule is stated thus:
'• If the property involved is of a speculative or
fluctuating- nature, n1ore than ordinary pro1nptness
is required of a clai1nant. He must present his
clahn at the earliest possible time. This rule is
applied with great strictness in the case of oil or
n1ining property since it is of an especially precarious nature, and is exposed to the utmost fluctuations in value.''

In T'UJin-Lick Oil Company v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587,
23 L. Ed. :328, the Supreme Court of the United States
refused rescission in a transaction involving oil properties and held the claimant to be barred by laches.
The opinion points out the necessity for strictness
where property of fluctuating value is involved.
We hesitate to present the defense of laches, because
of its ele1nent of confession and avoidance. We believe
that Magher is entitled to the decree of this court confirining the findings below which establish that he was
guilty of no fraud; that he committed no deceit; that
there is no actionable mistake; and that the attempt to
distort his n1isa pprehension as to the legal status of the
lease into a 1nisrepresentation relied upon by Stock is
not ~upported by the evidence. However, in excess of
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caution we urge the indisputable facts which foreclose
Stock and anyone claiming under him from rescinding
the transfer he gave to Meagher in October of 1944.

SUMMARY AND CON·CLUSION.

With apologies for imposing such a long brief upon a
.busy court, we will atten1pt here to briefly summarize
the entire argument point by point.
1. The court did not err in permitting 1\{eagher to
amend his reply because: ( 1) The reply actually added
nothing to Meagher's overall claims. His con1plaint
asserted .a fee simple. His reply merely conceded that
he could only prove a lesser estate. (2) The amended
reply was appropriate to dispute the affirmative claims
presented in the pleadings of appellants. As such the
reply was a proper answer to affirmative contentions.
It merely defined the issues more precisely than
Meagher's original reply which denied that the answering defendants had any interest in the property.

2.

Meagher is the real party in interest because:
( 1) Before he transferred his interest during the litigation he had acquired all of the interests he now
asserts, and (2) the transfer by a litigant of the
subject matter of a suit, pending litigation, does not
prevent completion of the litigation in that party's
name.
3. Meagher is neither guilty of laches nor is he
estopped from asserting his interest. As to laches:
(1) There 'vas no undue delay. Meagher began his
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action long before any drilling 'vas coinmenced and
has vigorously continued its prosecution. ( 2) Since all
appellants kne"~ that ~Jeagher had for1nally disputed
their elain1s since the very day the action was commenced, there 'vas no basis for any appellant to construe any delay "Thirh 1nay haYe occurred as a waiver
by ~Ieagher of any right he had. As to estoppel:
(1) There is no factual basis for such claim. (2) No
appellant took any action based upon any representation of ~Ieagher. (3) There was no reliance upon any
action or inaction attributable to Meagher.
4. There was no fraud.
5. The Stock to ~leagher transfer is supported by
valid legal consideration because: (1) Stock thereby
was relieved of his obligations under the lease as a
lessee. ( 2) Meagher did not pursue the quiet title suit
as against Stock after he received the transfer until
Stock voluntarily appeared.
6. Rescission cannot be granted for mistake because: ( 1.) The only nus take involved in the entire
action was Meagher's legal misapprehension as to the
validity of the lease; (2) Stock did not participate in
in that mistake; and ( 3) ·Stock placed no reliance upon
any representations 1nade by Meagher with respect to
the legal status of the lease.
7. The transfer, viewed as a surrender, can be sustained beeause: (1) It was not inconsistent with any
provision of the lease ; ( 2) as between Stock and
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Meagher the provisions of the lease could be superseded by any rnethod of surrender acceptable to them;
( 3) the document is supported by valid legal consideration as described above; (4) while Stock could not
surrender the interests of any co-lessee he could surrender his own lessee's rights, and that is all he did;
and ( 5) Meagher was the reversioner becaues he acquired via M. P. Smith and Alexander all of the rights
and interests of the landowner subject only to outstanding royalties and the lease itself.
8. The transfer is effective as a conveyance because
its words of grant meet all the requirements of a quitclaim deed.
9. Meagher is the equitable owner of the one-third
of two per cent landowner's royalty which Stock and
Phebus hold for him because: ( 1) their right to retain
this royalty was based on definite and specific conditions which have not been met; and ( 2) a quiet title
action is an appropriate action in which to determine
ariy interest in property, legal or equitable.
10. Although Stock has failed to make out a proper
c.ase for rescission, he is also barred from asserting
any such right because: (1) he knew as early as 1945
he would attack his own conveyance; ( 2) as early as
1945 he secreted his intentions from Meagher even
after express inquiry; (3) he permitted nearly five
years to elapse before making any claim or taking any
action ; and ( 4) his first action was taken only after
oil ·was discovered.
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Thus

~feagher

has squarely faced each point raised
by appellants. l~pon analysis it 'vill be. seen that the
solution to the case lies in its factual background. On
the •'paper rerord' · as disclosed by the title docun1ents
alone it does appear that Stock, eonceivably, might
have been Inisled as to his legal rights. This explains
the plausible pleadings presented by Juhan's lawyers
in Stock's behalf. But Stock 'vould have given Meagher
the requested transfer regardless of whether he wa~
obliged to do so. He 'vas finished with the Ashley
Valley oil play. In any event, he was completely indifferent as to the situation. It was only when Juhan
can1e along and suggested to Stock that exploration
might be financed that Stock sought to "back in" for
a mere one-eighth of his former interest if Juhan could
retrieve it from ~ieagher. The theories· of Stock's
pleadings, though untenable, are not unreasonable. But
when Stock was called to the stand by Meagher he was
not acquainted 'vith those pleadings. Thereupon all
support for the elaborate theories put forth in Stock's
behalf fell away.
For a time it appeared. to Meagher's counsel that
the case would present interesting problems of oil and
gas law. We welcomed the opportunity to present our
views to the Utah courts in the hope that we might
contribute so1nething to Utah's now unfolding law of
oil and g-as. However, the case is not concerned with
these interesting and important problems. Although
the facts themselves are interesting, the applicable law
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is limited to basic principles well known to and often
expounded by this court. This case turns on its facts.
The only lesson of the case so far as concerns oil
and gas is that oil men are tough and they will gamble.
Once appellants knew that they were safely entitled
to a one-half interest in this lease they knew their
drilling expenses were safe if oil could be discovered.
They also knew they stood the chances afforded by
litigation- to get the oth~r one-half. A Texas oil man
once said: ''Drill 'em up and let the oil buy your
title." That attitude has been assumed in this case
but it has failed.
We need not weep for these appellants notwithstand~
ing the touching plea with which their brief concludes.
They will fare handson1ely from the proceds of their
one-half interest in the leasehold. They have lost only
what they knew they did not have.
It is respectfully submitted that the decree below
should be affirmed.
Dated: October 29, 1951.
HERBERT vAN DAM,
GILBERT c. WHEAT,

Attorneys for Respondent
N.J. Meagher.

(Appendices A and B Follow.)
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Appendix A
·Here,vith \Ye set forth extrac-ts fron1 declarations of
trust disclosing the Stock-Hill-..Tuhan deal and other
related 1natters. En1phasis herein is ours.
Exhibit ~~-±8, an unrecorded agreement, was executed
by Chas. S. Hill 1 in favor of Paul Stock on April 14,
1945.
The declaration refers to the quitclaim which Stock
gave Hill on the san1e day (A-19), and then proceeds as
follows:
''Hill agrees to investigate the title of Stock in
respect to said lands: to manage the interest of
said Stock therein with all the rights of ownership,
including the right to * : :· * bring suits to assert,
protect and defend the said interest; to do whatever
in his judgment Inay be advisable to make. said interest valuable and saleable; and to pay all expenses in relation thereto. * * * It is the purpose
of the parties that ultin1ately the said interest shall
be converted into money or into a property with
unquestioned title. * * * what remains after payment of all the expenses and the satisfaction of all
obligations shall belong to the parties in the proportion of 12% per cent to Stock and 871h per cent
to Hill.''
Stock testified that Juhan told him that Hill was acting for
Juhan at the tin1e this declaration of trust was executed.
1
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The follo,ving is an extract from Exhibit A-49, an
unrecorded agreen1ent between Juhan and Chas. S. Hill
entered into January 5, 1946. Many of its clauses are
exact copies of the phraseology of Exhibit 48. Among
other things, this agreement provides:
"Juhan agrees to investigate the title of Hill in
respect to said land; to manage the interest of said
Hill therein with all the rights of ownership, including the right * * •X: to bring suits to assert,
protect and defend the said interest; to do whatever in his judgment may be advisable to make
said interest valuable and saleable; and to pay all
expenses in relation thereto * * * It is the purpose
of the parties that ultimately the said interest shall
be converted into money or into a property with
unquestioned title * * * ''
The following provisions of this agreement reflect
the parties' understanding 'Of Stock's position in the
transaction :
"It is recited that this declaration is 1nade with
the knowledge of and subject to a declaration by
Hill to one Paul Stock, of Cody, Wyoming, by the
terms of which the said Stock was to receive 12%
per cent of the net."
The following is particularly important:
''In order to fully show all interests that may
affect the interested parties as of this date, and
without increasing the interest of the said Stock,
it is now recited that one J. L. Dougan has agreed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iii
to finance all nece~8ary litigation for an undivided
50 per cent interest of the reeovery from the above
described land, 'vhich has been obtained by two
quitclaiin deeds and assign1nents, one from Ray
Phebus and one from J?aul Stock.''
The follo,ving discloses the reeognition by the parties
of the necessity of getting rid of Meagher's interest.
Thus:
d ~~ 12¥
2 per cent interest in the said recovery
fron1 the above described acreage belongs to said
Stock, based on his half interest when and if the
title to his interest is sustained by a court of competent jurisdiction or if his former interest is
adjudicated as belonging to N. J. Meagher, then
and in such event the said Stock shall have no
interest.''
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Appendix B
EXTRACTS FRtOM TES'TIMONY OF PAUL STOCK.

For the convenience of the court the following
extract is furnished which contains some of the more
important portions of Stock's testimony:
By Mr. Wheat:
Q. Your name is Paul Stock~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you are one of the defendants in this action 7
A. Yes, .sir.
Q. And what business are you in, Mr. Stock?
A. The oil business.
Q. How long have you been in the oil business!
A. Ever since I was a boy.
Q. You were engaged in the oil business during the
fall of 1944'
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And by the end of 1944 had you dealt extensively
with oil leases?
A. Quite a few, yes, sir.
Q. And royalties 1
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And oil interests of all kinds 1
A. Yes.
Q. And wasn't it about 1944 that you sold a good
part of your oil interests to the Texas Company?
A. That '.s right.
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Q. .A.s a 1natter of fact, in that deal you received
several million dollars for those interests, didn't you Y
A.
ell, it was involved.

'r

•

•

•

Q. Nov~T 'vhen you signed this release, this Exhibit
A-30, did you understand it to be a release of all of
your interests in the oil lease covering the lands involved in this suit'
A. No, sir.

•

•

Q. Nov..,. Mr. Stock, tell us in your own words what
your understanding was with respect to that document.
~Ir. Gustin. No'v we object to that, your Honor, on
the same grounds. The document speaks for itself, it
is the best evidence.

•

•

The Court. Let me have the question read, will you?
(Question read.)
The Court. He may answer it.
A. I thought that I was releasing to Mr. Meagher
a royalty that we had obtained from him to drill a well. 1
There ":-as so1ne overriding royalty and we wanted to
reduce the royalty, which we did do. And this, the
Note that the only explanation given by Stock as to the
state of his mind when he executed the release has never been
urged by appellants' counsel in this litigation. Of course~ an
error based upon such negligence would not support a rescission. Furthermore, the trial court has rejected the excuses
offered by Stock.
Appellants have consistently urged that Stock was misled as
to the legal status of the lease. The importance of this testimony is that it excludes that possibility.
1
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overriding royalty, amounted to so much, and if we
didn't drill the well, we had-I don't know whether we
legally give it back, we intended to give him back his
royalty if we didn't drill the well, but we did later
drill the well. 2
Mr. Wheat. Q. But in any event, the state of your
mind at the time you executed that document was that
you were giving back to Meagher the royalties he had
transferred to you and Mr. Phebus in order to cut down
the outstanding royalties at the time you transferred
the lease to the Standard Oil Company, isn't that right 1
A. That was right .

•

•

•

•

Q. Did you read the release before you signed it'
A. I never read it thoroughly. I just glanced over
it and signed it and sent it back.
Q. · And did you read the letter with which it was
sent to you~
A. I glanced ~at it, yes.
Q. Now about six months after you signed the release to 1\'Ir. Meagher, you gave a quitclaim deed of
your oil and gas rights under this Sheridan lease, to a
person by the name of Charles S. Hill, didn't. yont
A. Yes, sir.

2N ote the inconsistency of Stock's testimony. He claims that
he was not required to return the royalty in the same answer
which assigns the return of the royalty as his n1otive for executing the release of Meagher.
'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

..

Vll

Q. N o'v 'Yho 'vas Charles S. Hill·?
A. He had been a. friend of 1nine for a good many
years over there~ interested in the oil business and
leasing business.
Q. .Lind he didn't pay you anything for that quitclaim, did he 1
A. No.

•
Q. In the negotiations 'vith you and Charles Hill
at that tilne, he said dtransfer what interests you have
in this lease to Ine and I 'vill try to make something
of it,'' in words to that effect?

•
A. Mr. Hill stated that the property at Vernal in
Ashley \ 1 alley 'vas in litigation, and if I would turn
it over to him on that agreement, that he would handle
it and litigate it, or clean it up, clean the title.
Q. Then in consurm11ation of that agreement with
Hill, he gave you another document called a Declaration of Trust, didn't he~
A. The trust agree1nent was signed along with it.
Q. Now I show you Exhibit A-48 and ask you if
that isn't a photostatic copy of the trust agreement
you just referred to 1

•

•
Q. It is 1
A. Yes.

*

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

Viii
Q. Did you .subsequently have a conversation with
Mr. Juhan, in which you discussed your deal with
Charles S. Hill~
A. I had a good many different discussions with
Mr. Juhan.
Q. Well, in any of those discussions did Juhan tell
you that Charles S. Hill had been working for him
when he got that quitclaim deed from you?
A. He told me that he had acquired the Hill interest.
Q. And he told you that he sent Hill over to you
just for that purpose, didn't he~
A. Yes.

•

•

•

At the time of your transaction with Charles S.
Hill, did you tell him you· had given the release to
Mr. Meagher?
A. He told me, and we discussed it.
Q. And part of his job, after that deal was made,
was to eliminate any contentions that Meagher might
make with respect to that release, isn't that correctt
A. Yes.
Q.

•

•

•

Q. So my question is, after October of 1944 did you
ever give-comn1unicate to Mr. Meagher, by word or
by letter, or otherwise, that you intended to cancel or
repudiate the release that you had given him in Octoebr
of 1944!
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A. I don't think there 'vas ever any communication
behveen

~1r. ~Ieag·her
L

and· n1yself to that effect.
•

•
Q. Ko'v in July of 1948 you purchased a 25 per cent
interest in the Sheridan lease from Juhan, didn't you!
A. Yes, sir.

•
Q. Juhan then got the one eighth that you had reserved in your deal with Hill, I 1nean in July of 1948~
A. Yes.
Q. But you paid Juhan some $19,500 in that transaction, didn't you~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So you gave Juhan, according to your position,
the $19,500 cash, and your old one-eighth contingent
interest, didn't you~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And Juhan gave you a quarter interest in the
lease, according to your contentions, didn't he'
(Witness nods head affirmatively.)
Q. And you contended that the quarter interest in
the lease that you then got from Juhan was traceable
to the Phebus source of title, is that right~
A. Yes, sir.

•

•

•

•

Q. But it is a fact, isn't it, Mr. Stock, that the
reason you \vere putting good rnoney into that transaction was to get a position in that lease which was
independent of any clain1s of Meagher, isn't that true~
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A. I was putting the money into the lease with
Juhan and with Mr. Dougan in order to drill the well,
that we drilled.
Q. I know. Of course you were anticipating drilling
a .. well, but you were trying to get a 25 per cent in-terest in that lease, win, lose or draw, in the case with
Meagher, isn't that true~
A. That's the way the deed is.
Q. Well, that was your position too, wasn't it 7
A. That's right.

•
Q. Now have you read the answer and counterclaim
filed in your behalf in this case~
A. .No, sir.
Q. Haven't read it to this day'
A. No, sir.
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